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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 First 
Amendment-based decisions in both National Institute of Family and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees. The Article illustrates how the 
rulings in these right-not-to-speak cases deepen the divide on today’s 
Court over when a case affecting speech merits heightened First 
Amendment analysis (be it strict or intermediate scrutiny) and when it 
only deserves rational basis review as an economic or social 
regulation. The cases nudge to the breaking point a dangerous game 
of push-and-pull between the Court’s conservative and liberal justices 
over the scope of free expression that undermines any semblance of 
doctrinal coherence. The conservatives are turning more and more 
cases into First Amendment battles demanding something greater 
than rational basis review. This backs the liberals into a corner, 
forcing them to argue that heightened review only applies when “the 
true value of protecting freedom of speech” is at stake, such as 
facilitating democratic self-governance. In the process, the line 
between speech and conduct is blurred while outright animosity 
between the Court’s conservative and liberal camps percolates in 
opinions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court today is sharply divided over when 
cases affecting speech trigger traditional heightened levels of First 
Amendment1 scrutiny2 and when, instead, they merit only minimal,3 
rational basis review.4 Rational basis review is commonly associated 
                                                   
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.” Id. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were 
incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities 
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 2. See generally Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert & William C. Nevin, 
Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the 
Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350-60 (2011) (overviewing both 
strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence). 
Traditional heightened levels of First Amendment review include both strict scrutiny 
(for most content-based regulations) and intermediate scrutiny (for most content-
neutral regulations and statutes targeting commercial speech). See id. at 358. 
 3. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 419, 459 (2012) (noting that “minimal scrutiny” is “also referred to as 
‘rationality review’” and “functions as a rubber stamp for legislation, providing little 
more than a pretense of rationality”). 
 4. See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis 
Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s 
Fees, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 999, 1016 (2001). Rational basis review “requires only a 
rational relationship between the end (the legitimate governmental objective) and the 
means to that end (the statute whose constitutionality is at issue).” Id. Put differently, 
a court will declare a law unconstitutional under rational basis review “if it is not 
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with economic and social welfare regulations,5 and it typically “plays 
an extremely limited role in free speech cases.”6 Specifically, rational 
basis review applies when a law imposes only “incidental burdens on 
speech”7 or compels the disclosure of purely factual information in 
advertisements to prevent deception.8 
This Article analyzes how the Court’s 2018 decisions in both 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra9 and Janus 
v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees10 
bring this growing cleft among the justices into high relief.11 The rift 
mirrors the perceived conservative-versus-liberal division among the 
                                                   
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Rational Basis “Plus,” 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 449 (2017).  
 5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and 
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016) (asserting that “the Court has 
basically gotten it right about when to apply the rational basis test—using it to analyze 
government economic regulations and social welfare legislation when there is no 
discrimination based on a suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental 
right”) (emphasis added); Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 
Vill. L. Rev. 79, 79 (2018) (noting that rational basis review is “typically applied to 
review of economic and social regulations”). 
 6. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 787. 
 7. Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment 
Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 156 
n.101 (2001). 
 8. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(holding “that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers”); see also Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the 
Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (observing that the test in 
Zauderer is “akin to rational basis review”). The Court also applies a variation of 
rational basis review in cases involving the speech of public-school students that is 
sponsored by the school or that is part of the curriculum. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281 (1988). Specifically, the Court has held “that educators 
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and 
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273. As Dean 
Erwin Chemerinsky observes, this “is the classic phrasing of the rational basis 
review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The 
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013). 
 9. See generally Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 10. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. 
Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 11. See infra Sections III.B-C (analyzing, respectively, Becerra and Janus). 
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current justices.12 Exposed earlier in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,13 the 
conflict is highly significant. Why? Because the standard of scrutiny 
applied in a First Amendment case often affects its outcome.14 The 
outcome, in turn, frequently causes an immediate real-world impact, 
as it has for labor unions in the aftermath of Janus.15 
Perhaps even more disconcerting for some First Amendment 
traditionalists, the current cleavage on scrutiny jeopardizes the 
                                                   
 12. See infra Part II (examining decisions rendered before a successor to 
Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court). It considers Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch to be conservative, 
and it categorizes Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, 
and Elena Kagan as liberals. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives in 
Charge: Supreme Court Moved to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-
term-moved-right.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadam-
liptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=strea
m_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=145&pgtype=collection 
[https://perma.cc/7Q4V-EWHF] (describing the “four-member liberal wing” as 
comprised of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena 
Kagan; identifying the Court’s “most conservative members” as Clarence Thomas and 
Samuel Alito; noting that Neil Gorsuch “returned the [C]ourt to full strength and to a 
conservative majority” after the death of Antonin Scalia; and adding that Chief Justice 
John Roberts is moving more to the Court’s ideological center); Mark Walsh, Center 
Court, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2018, at 20, http://dashboard.mazsystems.com/ 
webreader/57538?page=22 [https://perma.cc/M3B3-VBJ8] (suggesting that it is 
likely Chief Justice John Roberts will become, after the retirement of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy at the end of July 2018, the Court’s new “median justice” who is “at its 
ideological center, as measured by political scientists who study the court”). 
 13. See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Part I 
(addressing Sorrell in detail). 
 14. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015). For 
instance, the Court recently observed that “a speech restriction withstands strict 
scrutiny” only in “rare cases.” Id. Or as former Justice David Souter once put it, “strict 
scrutiny leaves few survivors.” City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 
425, 455 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in 
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 305 (1997) (observing that “the 
Court’s free speech analysis has become dominated by tiers, with at least the highest 
and lowest tiers being largely outcome-determinative”); Clay Calvert, Beyond 
Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech, 2016-
2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 48 (asserting that “a statute is more likely to be struck 
down under strict scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny”). 
 15. See Kris Maher, Unions Take a Hit After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL 
STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unions-take-a-hit-
after-supreme-court-ruling-1533466800 [https://perma.cc/JRB9-H58C] (reporting 
that “[p]ublic-sector unions are facing steep falls in revenue and trying to prevent the 
loss of members in the wake of” the Court’s ruling in Janus and describing “the first 
signs of how the high court’s decision is hitting union coffers”). 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 77 
dichotomy between speech and conduct.16 Under this distinction, 
conduct—unless it is deemed expressive conduct or symbolic 
expression,17 such as burning the American flag in protest18—receives 
no First Amendment scrutiny.19 Put slightly differently, a contrast 
between speech and conduct “must be drawn under current law 
because the law subjects speech regulation to higher levels of scrutiny 
than economic regulation.”20 
This “fundamental distinction between speech and 
conduct”21 today is openly questioned by liberal-leaning Justice 
Stephen Breyer.22 He asserted in 2017 in Expressions Hair Design v. 
Schneiderman23 that “virtually all government regulation affects 
speech” and that “it is often wiser not to try to distinguish between 
‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’”24 In stark contrast, conservative Justice 
Clarence Thomas25 wrote in 2018 in National Institute of Family & 
                                                   
 16. See Diahann Dasilva, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying 
Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 767, 769-70 (2015) (noting “the speech versus conduct dichotomy,” and 
examining “the distinction between speech and conduct, the implications of that 
distinction, and how courts have classified various activities as speech or conduct”). 
 17. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment 
affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”). 
 18. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 19. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that “a general law regulating conduct and not specifically 
directed at expression . . . is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all”). 
 20. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the First Amendment, 41 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2018). 
 21. Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic 
Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015). 
 22. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Trump Makes His Pick, but It’s Still Anthony 
Kennedy’s Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-makes-his-pick-but-its-
still-anthony-kennedys-supreme-court/2017/01/31/1de12472-e7e0-11e6-bf6f-
01b6b443624_story.html?utm_term=.3e49a22f69a8 [https://perma.cc/7DSW-
ASFK] (identifying Breyer as one “of the court’s four liberals”); see also Richard 
Wolf & Herb Jackson, Supreme Court Could Make Sports-Betting Ban an Underdog, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017, 1:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2017/12/04/supreme-court-could-make-sports-betting-ban-
underdog/919347001/ [https://perma.cc/FBY8-Z64H] (identifying Breyer as “one of 
the court’s four liberals”). 
 23. See generally Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017). 
 24. Id. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 25. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rules for Christian Cake 
Baker but Voices Support for Gay Rights Too, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-baker-wedding-20180604-
story.html [https://perma.cc/9QMU-GBZQ] (identifying Thomas as 
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Life Advocates v. Becerra that “[w]hile drawing the line between 
speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long 
drawn it.”26 In other words, while Breyer gives short shrift to the 
speech–conduct dichotomy, Thomas willingly enforces it.27 
The boundary is now tremendously blurred between what 
Thomas in Becerra called laws regulating “speech as speech”28 and 
what Breyer, writing for a four-justice dissent in the same dispute, 
called those affecting “ordinary social and economic legislation.”29 
The conservative and liberal justices simply do not see eye-to-eye on 
the issue and therefore disagree about the constitutionality of multiple 
laws impacting free expression.30 
In Becerra, California’s regulation of speech at licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers fell into the former speech-as-speech category for 
the five-justice conservative majority.31 This, in turn, triggered 
heightened First Amendment review and led the majority to conclude 
that the petitioners attacking the law were “likely to succeed on the 
merits of their challenge.”32 Conversely, the four-justice liberal dissent 
                                                   
“[c]onservative”); see also Richard Wolf, Justice Anthony Kennedy to Retire, 
Opening Supreme Court Seat for President Trump, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018, 6:32 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/27/justice-kennedy-
retiring-opening-supreme-court-seat/952716001/ [https://perma.cc/V4NB-4373] 
(describing Thomas as “ultra-conservative”). 
 26. Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2373 (2018). 
 27. Compare Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that the speech-conduct dichotomy should not be made), with 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (supporting the speech-conduct dichotomy in a majority 
opinion authored by Justice Thomas). 
 28. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 29. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 30. See, e.g., id. (finding by the more conservative majority that the speech-
conduct dichotomy should remain versus the more liberal dissenters finding that the 
speech-conduct dichotomy is not useful). 
 31. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (“The licensed notice regulates speech as 
speech.”); see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016). Specifically, 
the California statute required such licensed facilities to post a notice stating: 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to 
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of 
contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether 
you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the telephone 
number].” Id. 
 32. Id. at 2376. “[T]he licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate 
scrutiny. California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing 
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services. Assuming that 
this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to 
achieve it.” Id. at 2375. 
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found the statute fit into the latter social legislation category and thus 
was subject to a deferential approach of reasonableness under which 
it was “likely constitutional.”33 
In Janus, the five-justice conservative majority reasoned that 
“[f]undamental free speech rights”34 were threatened by a state law 
that compelled public employees who were not union members to pay 
agency or fair-share fees to support the collective bargaining activities 
of the union that exclusively represented them.35 In striking down the 
law, the majority flatly rejected the notion that rational basis review 
should apply in analyzing the statute’s constitutionality.36 Justice 
Samuel Alito explained for the majority that “[b]ecause the compelled 
subsidization of private speech seriously impinge[d] on First 
Amendment rights, it [could not] be casually allowed.”37 
In contrast, the Janus dissenters contended that “government 
entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’ 
speech.”38 As Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the dissent, the Court 
typically has an attitude “of respect—even solicitude—for the 
government’s prerogatives as an employer. So long as the government 
is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting the employment 
relationship for other ends—it has a wide berth, comparable to that of 
a private employer.”39 She criticized the majority for violating the 
Court’s “usual deferential approach” and, in the process, “turning 
                                                   
 33. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court has adopted a “respectful approach to economic and social 
legislation when a First Amendment claim like the claim present here is at issue”); id. 
at 2381-87 (observing that “[h]istorically, the Court has been wary of claims that 
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the 
Constitution”; noting that the government historically has been able to impose 
“reasonable requirements” and “reasonable conditions” on such activities (including 
those of medical professionals); and concluding that when it comes to laws requiring 
medical professionals to disclose factual information, “[t]here is no reason to subject 
such laws to heightened scrutiny”). 
 34. Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 
(2018). 
 35. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/6(e) (2013) (providing that non-union 
employees may be required to pay “their proportionate share of the costs of the 
collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting 
wages, hours and other conditions of employment”); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2489 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that agency fees are “now often called fair-share fees”). 
 36. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (majority opinion) (“This form of minimal 
scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”). 
 37. Id. at 2464. 
 38. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. at 2493. 
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the First Amendment into a sword” to attack “workaday economic and 
regulatory policy.”40 
Lurking beneath this scrutiny schism in Becerra and Janus is an 
effort by some liberal justices to confine the scope of heightened First 
Amendment protection to only cases in which, as Justice Breyer wrote 
in Becerra, certain “First Amendment goals” are served and when “the 
true value of protecting freedom of speech” is at stake.41 Echoing 
Breyer’s sentiment, Justice Kagan wrote for the dissent in Janus that 
instead of applying heightened and “aggressive” First Amendment 
scrutiny to “workaday economic and regulatory policy,” “[t]he First 
Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to 
undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over the 
role of public-sector unions.”42 Put differently, just because a law 
involves speech does not mean that it always triggers weighty First 
Amendment concerns. 
In 2015 in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Kagan also suggested 
that strict scrutiny does not always apply when evaluating the 
constitutionality of content-based sign ordinances because “the 
vindication of First Amendment values” does not require usage of that 
level of scrutiny.43 Such a values-based approach for determining 
scrutiny differs from the Court’s long-standing general method44 and 
                                                   
 40. Id. at 2494, 2501. 
 41. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382-
83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 42. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501-02 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 43. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2239 (2015) (Kagan, J., 
concurring). 
 44. See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-
Reed Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 125 (2017) (noting that the Court has 
used the distinction between “content-neutral vs. content-specific” laws “for almost 
half a century” in order “to assign judicial standards of review to regulations on 
expression”). The doctrinal roots trace back to the Court’s decision in Police 
Department of City of Chicago v. Mosely. See 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In Mosely, the 
Court observed that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content.” Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Playing Favorites? Justice Scalia, 
Abortion Protests, and Judicial Impartiality, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 23, 27 
(2016) (“The Court applies a much more stringent test to speech restrictions that relate 
to content. The content distinction found its first clear expression in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley.”). 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 81 
“default rule”45 of initially deciding if a law is content based or content 
neutral in order to then determine the correct standard of scrutiny.46   
The idea that the value of speech determines the level of scrutiny 
is embraced by First Amendment scholars such as former Yale Law 
School Dean Robert Post.47 As Post contends, “First Amendment 
coverage is triggered by those forms of social interaction that 
realize First Amendment values.”48 All of this harkens back to 
considerations of high and low-value speech embraced by the Court 
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and the accompanying notion that 
low-value categories of speech either receive no First Amendment 
protection or “can be regulated on the basis of their content without 
having to satisfy strict scrutiny.”49 
                                                   
 45. David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 359, 367-68 (2015) (observing that “First Amendment doctrine has evolved into 
a mix of rule-like approaches, like the default rule that content-based speech 
restrictions are evaluated under strict scrutiny, and standard-like approaches, like the 
intermediate scrutiny standard applied to content-neutral speech restrictions”). 
 46. As Professor Leslie Kendrick encapsulates the traditional approach: 
After distinguishing content-based from content-neutral laws, the Court 
must give each its appropriate level of review. This is the scrutiny analysis. 
Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves 
fatal. Meanwhile, content-neutral laws receive what the Court calls 
“intermediate scrutiny,” in practice a highly deferential form of review 
which virtually all laws pass. 
Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012) 
(emphasis omitted). Professor Genevieve Lakier echoes Kendrick’s description, 
putting it this way: 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of 
speech is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades 
now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that 
restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can 
satisfy strict scrutiny. In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate 
speech for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser, 
and often quite deferential, standard. 
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the 
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2016). 
 47. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 181-82 (2015) (“Different kinds of speech embody different 
constitutional values, and each kind of speech should receive constitutional 
protections appropriate to the value it embodies.”). 
 48. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000). 
 49. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 2166, 2171 (2015); see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 
(1942). In Chaplinksy, the Court wrote that some categories of speech serve “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
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The subjectivity, however, of an approach limiting elevated First 
Amendment review to cases affecting the “true value” of free 
expression and confining its reach to “better things” such as 
“democratic governance” profoundly impacts extant First 
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, does this tack mean that 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n in 2011 was wrongly 
decided?50 The Court there applied strict scrutiny to strike down a 
California law and, in doing so, protected the First Amendment rights 
of children to play violent video games.51  
On its face, the “true value”—whatever that nebulous concept 
means—of protecting free expression seemingly has nothing to do 
with either shielding violent video games or safeguarding minors’ 
access to them.52 Similarly, Justice Kagan might reasonably find that 
“[t]he First Amendment was meant for better things” than protecting 
violent video games, which arguably do not serve her focus on 
“protect[ing] democratic governance.”53 Should, then, Brown be 
overruled under this approach? It is worth recalling that Breyer, in 
fact, dissented in Brown and would have held California’s violent 
video game statute constitutional.54 
Likewise, would public indecency laws targeting nude 
dancing—a form of conduct now recognized as symbolic expression 
protected by the First Amendment55—in sexually oriented businesses 
                                                   
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see also Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
189, 194 (1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous 
dictum of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”). 
 50. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 51. See id. at 799 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of 
protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict 
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is 
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”); id. at 789, 794-95 (addressing the First 
Amendment rights of minors). The statute at issue in Brown banned “the sale or rental 
of ‘violent video games’ to minors.” Id. at 789. 
 52. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2383 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) 
 54. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 55. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment 
affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”); 
see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000) (holding nude dancing “is 
expressive conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First 
Amendment”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (concluding 
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no longer be subject to intermediate scrutiny?56 Should nude dancing 
regulations, instead, simply be reviewed under a rational basis 
standard? To the extent that such laws target only the secondary 
effects of nude dancing,57 “such as the impacts on public health, safety, 
and welfare,”58 they typically have been considered content-neutral 
regulations59 subject to the intermediate scrutiny test of United States 
v. O’Brien.60  
But if Justice Breyer is correct that courts should not focus on 
the distinction between speech and conduct,61 and if public indecency 
statutes really amount to what he calls “ordinary social and economic 
regulation” rather than laws targeting free expression, and if 
safeguarding nude dancing does not represent what Breyer calls “the 
true value of protecting freedom of speech,” then it seems that rational 
basis review—not intermediate scrutiny—should apply.62 Similarly, 
might Justice Kagan find that regulating nude dancing to address 
health, safety, and welfare issues amounts to a “workaday economic 
                                                   
that nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First 
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”). 
 56. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-72 (applying the four-part test developed by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
 57. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that secondary effects of speech are 
ones “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience”). When it comes to the 
zoning of sexually oriented businesses, “secondary effects have most often included 
alleged increases in crime, decreases in property values, and other indicators of 
neighborhood deterioration in the area surrounding the adult business.” Bryant Paul, 
Daniel Linz & Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses 
Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative 
Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 356 (2001). 
 58. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 292. 
 59. Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects 
Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1187, 1201 (2013) (“The development of the secondary effects doctrine . . . permits 
laws that are clearly content based to be treated as content neutral in certain 
circumstances.”). 
 60. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 293-99; see also John Fee, The Pornographic 
Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 292 (2009) (noting that under the 
secondary effects doctrine, “a regulation will be treated as content-neutral and subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-discriminatory form, if the primary 
purpose of the regulation is to control the secondary effects rather than the primary 
effects of speech”). 
 61. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t is often wiser not to try to distinguish between 
‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’”). 
 62. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381, 
2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and regulatory policy” and that “[t]he First Amendment was meant for 
better things” than protecting nude dancing inside of sexually oriented 
businesses?63 
Speculatively speaking, the latent political desires in 2018 of 
both the conservative and liberal justices pushed an already shaky and 
unstable First Amendment methodology over scrutiny to an 
exceedingly dangerous place.64 It is a place where deciding when a 
case involving speech constitutes a true First Amendment-based 
dispute demanding heightened review and when, in contrast, it 
amounts to a mere economic regulation requiring only rational basis 
evaluation is anything but clear. More specifically—and in the starkest 
and, admittedly, the most stereotypical of terms—the conservative 
justices, in attempting to protect pro-life organizations in Becerra and 
deplete the cash coffers of unions in Janus, have created the potential 
for turning any regulation that affects a specific content category of 
speech into a First Amendment battle involving either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny review. 
In a nutshell, this is what Justice Kagan meant in her Janus 
dissent when she castigated the conservative majority for 
“weaponizing the First Amendment.”65 Breyer too evoked the 
weaponization argument in his Becerra dissent.66 Furthermore, it is 
what concerns a bevy of legal scholars67 who, as Professors Jane and 
Derek Bambauer encapsulate it, fear “a new free speech 
                                                   
 63. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501, 
2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 64. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of 
Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. 
Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 509 (2012) (“First Amendment free speech doctrine 
can be mystifying because it has never really settled in on a consistent analytical 
methodology.”). 
 65. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 66. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Medical 
professionals do not, generally speaking, have a right to use the Constitution as a 
weapon allowing them rigorously to control the content of those reasonable 
conditions.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil 
Rights Movement, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 22 (2016) (“I remain concerned that this 
expansive First Amendment will prove to be an unworkable burden on beneficial 
regulation intended to protect public health, safety, and welfare.”); see also Post & 
Shanor, supra note 47, at 166-67 (“Across the country, plaintiffs are using the First 
Amendment to challenge commercial regulations, in matters ranging from public 
health to data privacy. It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has 
become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are 
palpable.”). 
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Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment to promote a 
broad deregulatory agenda, regardless of popular democratic will.”68 
Put differently, the worry is “that free speech claims could be launched 
against every conceivable governmental regulation, potentially 
destroying the modern regulatory state.”69 In this critique, as Professor 
Margot Kaminski notes, “the First Amendment has become a blunt 
tool of deregulation.”70 
Much of this line of scholarly critique focuses on how, in cases 
such as Sorrell, corporations exploit the First Amendment for 
deregulatory ends.71 Although the results in both Becerra and Janus 
reflect the trend of “deregulatory First Amendment cases,”72 neither 
involved a big-business corporate plaintiff seeking to strike down a 
regulation directly affecting its products, services, or marketing.73 In 
brief, the conservative justices in both Becerra and Janus extended 
their alleged assault on regulatory frameworks via different 
protagonists (or, perhaps, antagonists). That, in short, is the critique 
against the conservative justices.  
But what about the flip side? The liberal justices, in attempting 
to facilitate pro-choice speech and enhance access to abortions in 
Becerra and to maintain funding for unions in Janus, have threatened 
to reduce First Amendment scrutiny to rational basis review unless the 
speech at issue serves a “true value” with which the First Amendment 
is concerned or amorphously “better things” such as “protect[ing] 
                                                   
 68. Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 
105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2017); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) 
(declaring unconstitutional, as an interference with the right to contract under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute limiting the number of 
hours that a baker could work). 
 69. Bambauer & Baumbauer, supra note 68, at 342; see also Morgan N. 
Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant 
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (2017) (noting that “today 
litigants—often corporate litigants—increasingly use the First Amendment to 
prioritize new applications of the freedom of speech over regulations designed to 
protect consumers and citizens”). 
 70. Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
167, 172 (2017). 
 71. See Piety, supra note 67, at 1 (“The last twenty years have seen the 
development of a remarkable expansion of the First Amendment to business 
enterprises. The First Amendment has become a powerful weapon against regulation 
of all kinds.”). 
 72. Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323 (2016). 
 73. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). 
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democratic governance.”74 This tack arguably reeks of subjectivity 
about values and supposedly better things that muddies any semblance 
of coherence in an already “tumultuous doctrinal sea.”75 
It all, then, amounts to a treacherous push-and-pull situation. In 
brief, the more the conservative justices push for applying heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny to regulations harming speech interests, the 
more the liberal justices attempt—even with little more at their 
disposal than the parade-of-horribles rhetoric one expects from 
blistering dissents76—to pull the reins back on which regulations 
deserve elevated First Amendment review. It is a dangerous judicial 
game of chicken played by both sides, threatening a foundation of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. If little else, as this Article later suggests, 
it creates space for Justice Breyer’s desired proportionality review to 
eventually take root among the doctrinal ruins.77 
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.78 Sorrell provides a crucial basis for better 
understanding today’s friction over when a statute affecting speech 
merits heightened scrutiny and when, in contrast, it deserves 
deferential review as an ordinary piece of economic or commercial 
legislation. Sorrell, importantly, was disparaged by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor in 2018 in Janus for how it has been used and, arguably, 
abused by the Court.79 That is especially noteworthy because 
Sotomayor voted with, as the lone liberal, a bloc of conservative 
justices in Sorrell to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny in 
that case.80 Colloquially put, Sotomayor in Janus saw the error of her 
                                                   
 74. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 
2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 75. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000). 
 76. See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In accord 
with a parade-of-horribles attack, Justice Breyer asserted in his Becerra dissent that 
“the majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the 
constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government regulation.” Id. He added 
that “the majority’s view, if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps 
placing much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk, 
depending on how broadly its exceptions are interpreted.” Id.  
 77. See infra Part II (addressing Breyer’s embracement of proportionality) 
 78. See infra Part I (discussing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.); see generally 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 79. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although I joined 
the majority in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., . . . I disagree with the way that this Court 
has since interpreted and applied that opinion.”). 
 80. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 556 (identifying the justices voting in the 
majority and dissent). 
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ways in Sorrell.81 Additionally, Sorrell merits special attention here 
because Justice Elena Kagan, in penning the dissent in Janus, singled 
it out as an example of a case in which “the Court has wielded the First 
Amendment in such an aggressive way.”82 
Part II describes Justice Breyer’s repeated denigration of the 
Court’s embrace of traditional First Amendment doctrines relating to 
standards of scrutiny, further laying the groundwork for today’s 
disagreement on the Court.83 Part III then analyzes, in greater depth 
and detail, key aspects of the Court’s decisions in three very recent 
cases—Expressions Hair Design, Becerra, and Janus.84 Viewed 
collectively, this trio of cases lays bare the fault line separating the 
justices on standards of scrutiny and when a case affecting speech 
merits rigorous First Amendment review. Finally, Part IV concludes 
by proposing and exploring several different paths that the Court could 
now take in determining the level of scrutiny that applies in a case 
implicating speech.85 
I. SORRELL PAVES THE PATH TOWARD TODAY’S FRICTION: LOOKING 
BACK AT A WEDGE-ISSUE CASE 
In 2011, a fractured U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc. declared unconstitutional a Vermont statute that banned 
pharmacies from selling information about the prescription practices 
of identifiable physicians to purchasers for use in marketing.86 The law 
also barred pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers—namely, 
drug salespeople known as detailers87—from using prescriber 
                                                   
 81. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Sotomayor’s 
vote with the conservatives in Sorrell may be perceived as an outlier, as Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky notes that she “has been predictably with the liberals” since joining the 
nation’s high court. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Senate Can Demand Answers from Brett 
Kavanaugh. If He Isn’t Honest, He Shouldn’t Be Confirmed, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 
2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-
kavanaugh-confirmation-questions-20180711-story.html [https://perma.cc/NZ4D-
K2NR]. 
 82. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 83. See infra Part II (detailing Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach). 
 84. See infra Part III (discussing the key decisions in Expressions Hair 
Design, Becerra, and Janus). 
 85. See infra Part IV (providing different options for the Court to consider).  
 86. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557-63 (2011) (describing 
the statute, the legislative intent behind it and Vermont’s interpretation of it). 
 87. See id. at 557-58 (describing detailing and the work of detailers on behalf 
of pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
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information in marketing.88 In a nutshell, pharmacies in Vermont 
could freely share information about physicians’ prescribing practices 
“with anyone for any reason” unless the information was “to be used 
for marketing.”89  
A key purpose behind the statute was “to diminish the 
effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”90 
The law attempted to do this by “preventing detailers—and only 
detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and 
informative manner.”91 Vermont asserted this was important because 
it ostensibly would lower costs by allowing generic alternatives to 
brand-name drugs to compete more fairly in the face of otherwise 
“expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors.”92 In 
other words, because “detailers who use prescriber-identifying 
information are effective in promoting brand-name drugs,” blocking 
this flow of information would supposedly level the playing field for 
less expensive alternative drugs.93 
Ultimately, the outcome in Sorrell “hinged on what level of First 
Amendment scrutiny the Supreme Court would apply to the Vermont 
law.”94 The division, in turn, among the conservative and liberal 
justices over the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to that law 
foreshadows today’s tension in cases such as Becerra and Janus.95 
Anthony Kennedy penned the six-justice majority opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, Samuel Alito and a lone liberal, Sonia Sotomayor.96 The 
majority concluded the Vermont statute was subject to “heightened 
judicial scrutiny” under the First Amendment because it “impose[d] 
burdens that [were] based on the content of speech and that [were] 
                                                   
 88. See id. at 563 (noting that the law “bars pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and detailers from using the information for marketing”). 
 89. Id. at 572. 
 90. Id. at 565.  
 91. Id. at 564. 
 92. Id. at 576, 580 (quoting 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(4)). 
 93. Id. at 578. 
 94. Marcia M. Boumil et al., Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and 
the First Amendment: The U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 21 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 447, 448 (2012). 
 95. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). 
 96. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 556. 
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aimed at a particular viewpoint.”97 How did the law impose such 
burdens? Kennedy explained that: 
[The statute] disfavor[ed] marketing, that is, speech with a particular 
content. More than that, the statute disfavor[ed] specific speakers, namely 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. As a result of th[o]se content- and speaker-
based rules, detailers [could not] obtain prescriber-identifying information, 
even though the information [could] be purchased or acquired by other 
speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints. Detailers [were] likewise 
barred from using the information for marketing, even though the 
information [could] be used by a wide range of other speakers.98 
The majority rejected Vermont’s argument that heightened 
scrutiny was “unwarranted because its law [was] a mere commercial 
regulation.”99 Kennedy acknowledged that “the First Amendment does 
not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from 
imposing incidental burdens on speech.”100 Yet he concluded that 
Vermont’s law “impose[d] more than an incidental burden on 
protected expression.”101 Kennedy reasoned here that the statute did 
not “simply have an effect on speech, but [was] directed at certain 
content and [was] aimed at particular speakers.”102 In brief, because 
the law imposes “a content- and speaker-based burden,” it “require[d] 
heightened judicial scrutiny.”103  
“[I]ncidental burden”104—or a very close phrasing, namely 
“incidental effect,” which is used by the Court when sussing out 
whether a statute is content neutral105—thus is a crucial, yet highly 
elastic concept.106 It can be stretched or contracted to suit a desired 
outcome.107 Indeed, as noted below,108 the Sorrell dissent—in contrast 
                                                   
 97. Id. at 565. 
 98. Id. at 564. 
 99. Id. at 566. 
 100. Id. at 567. 
 101. Id.   
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 570. 
 104. Id. at 567. 
 105. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation 
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if 
it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 106. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996) (discussing laws imposing incidental burdens 
trigger more deferential judicial scrutiny). 
 107. See generally id. (providing a comprehensive review of the meaning and 
importance of the concept of incidental burdens in federal constitutional law). 
 108. Infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing the Sorrell 
dissent). 
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to the majority—found the burden on speech imposed by Vermont’s 
statute to be “indirect, incidental, and entirely commercial.”109 
Furthermore, the majority clearly disliked the fact that Vermont 
manipulated the marketplace of ideas110 for factual and truthful 
information about pharmaceutical products simply because the 
regulated speech was, in the government’s opinion, too influential and 
persuasive.111 As Kennedy wrote in wrapping up the majority opinion, 
Vermont “burdened a form of protected expression that it found too 
persuasive. At the same time, the State ha[d] left unburdened those 
speakers whose messages [were] in accord with its own views. This 
the State [could not] do.”112 Put differently, Vermont could not 
“hamstring”113 the speech of detailers when the proper remedy at its 
disposal was counterspeech.114 More specifically, the state could 
express “through its own speech” its displeasure “that detailers who 
use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting 
                                                   
 109. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 110. See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT 
THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). The marketplace of 
ideas theory is “one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers 
and for laypersons.” See id. It pivots on the assumption that free speech “contributes 
to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying 
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). In fact, “much 
of First Amendment jurisprudence rests” on “[t]he hypothetical construct of a 
marketplace of ideas.” Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 
382 (2018). 
 111. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (“Facts, after all, are the beginning point for 
much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct 
human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information 
is speech for First Amendment purposes.”); id. at 579 (“The State nowhere contends 
that detailing is false or misleading within the meaning of this Court’s First 
Amendment precedents.”); id. at 578 (“That the State finds expression too persuasive 
does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”). The majority 
emphasized that the free flow of information “has great relevance in the fields of 
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.” Id. at 566. 
 112. Id. at 580. 
 113. Id. at 578. 
 114. Justice Louis Brandeis explained the counterspeech doctrine more than 
ninety years ago, contending that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to 
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, 
Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU 
L. REV. 553, 553-54 (“Rather than censor allegedly harmful speech and thereby risk 
violating the First Amendment protection of expression, or file a lawsuit that threatens 
to punish speech perceived as harmful, the preferred remedy is to add more speech to 
the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.”). 
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brand-name drugs.”115 The majority thus found the statute violated the 
First Amendment,116 regardless of whether the intermediate scrutiny 
standard that typically applies in commercial speech cases117 or a 
higher standard applied.118 
In summary, under the majority’s approach in Sorrell, 
heightened scrutiny applies when a law imposes more than an 
incidental burden on speech, regardless of whether the law regulates 
commerce. Something more than an incidental burden exists when a 
law “is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular 
speakers.”119 A law, in turn, is directed at certain content when it is 
enacted because the government disagrees with the message being 
conveyed.120 
In contrast, the three-justice dissent—authored by Justice 
Stephen Breyer and joined by fellow liberal Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Elena Kagan—concluded that the statute’s “effect on 
expression [was] inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort 
to regulate a commercial enterprise. The First Amendment does not 
require courts to apply a special ‘heightened’ standard of review when 
                                                   
 115. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578. 
 116. Id. at 557 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of 
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. As a 
consequence, Vermont’s statute must be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. The 
law cannot satisfy that standard.”). 
 117. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the government may regulate 
truthful and non-misleading advertisements for lawful goods and services if it has a 
substantial interest that is directly advanced by the law in question and if the law is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980). The Central Hudson test represents 
an intermediate scrutiny standard. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 
65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2014) (noting that “the Supreme Court differentiates 
between commercial speech (such as advertising) and noncommercial speech, and 
subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny”); Levi, supra note 8, at 681, n.172 (2015) 
(noting that in Central Hudson, the Court articulated “a four-pronged standard of 
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech 
and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 198 (2015) (describing “the 
intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. [sic] v. Public 
Service Commission”). 
 118. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (“As in previous cases, however, the outcome 
is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial 
scrutiny is applied.”). 
 119. Id. at 567. 
 120. Id. at 566 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)) (“The First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the 
government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message 
it conveys.’”). 
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reviewing such an effort.”121 Under both this deferential tack and the 
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable in commercial speech 
cases,122 the dissent declared Vermont’s law constitutional.123 As 
Breyer summed it up, “whether we apply an ordinary commercial 
speech standard or a less demanding standard, I believe Vermont’s law 
is consistent with the First Amendment.”124 
In accord with his penchant for a proportionality approach to 
cases affecting free speech,125 Breyer deemed the key issue in Sorrell 
to be “whether Vermont’s regulatory provisions work[ed] harm 
to First Amendment interests that [was] disproportionate to their 
furtherance of legitimate regulatory objectives.”126 Reflecting the 
deference due to the government under this methodology, Breyer 
wrote that he “would give significant weight to legitimate commercial 
regulatory objectives.”127 In the dissent’s view, the Court should “defer 
significantly to legislative judgment” when “ordinary commercial or 
regulatory legislation . . . affects speech in less direct ways.”128  
The notion of ordinariness reflected in Breyer’s phrase “ordinary 
commercial or regulatory legislation” in the sentence immediately 
above was pivotal for framing the dissent’s analysis.129 In fact, Breyer 
in Sorrell also used the phrases “ordinary economic regulatory 
                                                   
 121. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. (“And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard 
this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial 
speech.”). 
 123. See id. As Breyer wrote, “I believe that the statute before us satisfies the 
‘intermediate’ standards this Court has applied to restrictions on commercial speech. 
A fortiori it satisfies less demanding standards that are more appropriately applied in 
this kind of commercial regulatory case.” Id. at 602. 
 124. Id. at 603. 
 125. See, e.g., Jeffery C. Barnum, Encouraging Congress to Encourage 
Speech: Reflections on United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 527, 546-48 (2012) 
(addressing Breyer’s proportionality approach and calling it “vexing for lawmakers 
because it is difficult to know when the balance tips towards constitutionality”); see 
also Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Pragmatism, the Supreme Court, and Democratic 
Revolution, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 652 (2012) (noting that Breyer “advocates 
proportionality analysis, or balancing, as how the Court should candidly weigh state 
versus individual interests”); Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech 
Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495, 519 (2015) (contending that 
proportionality review “contextualizes the relevant factors at play in the litigation to 
determine whether the restriction on speech outweighs the government’s important 
interest”). 
 126. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 584. 
 129. Id. 
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programs,” “ordinary regulatory programs” and “ordinary regulatory 
means.”130 This foreshadowed his 2018 dissent in Becerra where, as 
noted in the Introduction, Breyer used the phrase “ordinary economic 
and social legislation,” as well as “ordinary social and economic 
regulation,” and “ordinary disclosure laws.”131 
For the Sorrell dissent, the Vermont law fit cleanly within the 
scope of such an ordinary regulatory program.132 As Breyer explained, 
Sorrell was “a case where the government [sought] typical regulatory 
ends (lower drug prices, more balanced sales messages) through the 
use of ordinary regulatory means (limiting the commercial use of data 
gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate). The speech-related 
consequences here [were] indirect, incidental, and entirely 
commercial.”133 
In addition to foreshadowing the division among the 
conservative and liberal justices in 2018 in Becerra and Janus on 
whether a statute affecting speech triggers heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny, Sorrell also presaged Breyer’s parade-of-
horribles warning about a virtual deregulatory tsunami in his Becerra 
dissent.134 Specifically, Breyer wrote in Sorrell that the majority’s 
logic at best “opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges 
to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect 
a commercial message . . . . At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-
New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decision 
making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”135 In brief, 
the specter of returning to Lochner v. New York animated Breyer’s 
logic in Sorrell.136 
                                                   
 130. Id. at 584, 602. 
 131. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380-
81 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 132. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See infra notes 310-311 and accompanying text. 
 135. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 136. On this point, Breyer contended in Sorrell that: 
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon 
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens to 
return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its 
interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much 
abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories 
preferred by individual jurists . . . . By inviting courts to scrutinize whether 
a State’s legitimate regulatory interests can be achieved in less restrictive 
ways whenever they touch (even indirectly) upon commercial speech, 
today’s majority risks repeating the mistakes of the past in a manner not 
anticipated by our precedents. 
94 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
In Becerra, Breyer reiterated this concern about opening the 
floodgates of deregulation-targeted litigation.137 He wrote that “the 
majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over 
the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government 
regulation.”138 Breyer also came back to his Lochner theme in Becerra, 
opining that “[i]n the name of the First Amendment, the majority today 
treads into territory where the pre-New Deal, as well as the post-New 
Deal, Court refused to go.”139 
For the Sorrell dissent, then, the majority’s invocation of 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny in similar cases vests the 
judiciary with a too-powerful weapon for intruding on the regulatory 
province of the legislative branch in commercial and economic 
matters.140 “Because the imposition of ‘heightened’ scrutiny in such 
instances would significantly change the legislative/judicial balance, 
in a way that would significantly weaken the legislature’s authority to 
regulate commerce and industry, I would not apply a ‘heightened’ 
First Amendment standard of review in this case,” Justice Breyer 
wrote.141 The proper remedy for those upset by laws like the one at 
issue in Sorrell—at least for the dissent—is not a heightened First 
Amendment challenge.142 Instead, it is either better lobbying of current 
legislators to change the existing laws or to vote those legislators out 
of office in favor of ones who will embrace different policies.143 
Courts, in the dissent’s view, should only intervene when economic-
oriented statutes like those at issue in Sorrell lack any rationality.144  
Professor Tamara Piety concurs with the dissent’s analysis, 
contending that Sorrell “strikes at the heart of the government’s ability 
                                                   
Id. at 591-92 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
 137. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2382. 
 140. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 592 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id.  
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. (“Nothing in Vermont’s statute undermines the ability of persons 
opposing the State’s policies to speak their mind or to pursue a different set of policy 
objectives through the democratic process.”). 
 144. Id. (“This does not mean that economic regulation having some effect on 
speech is always lawful. Courts typically review the lawfulness of statutes for 
rationality and of regulations (if federal) to make certain they are not ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.’”). 
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to regulate commerce.”145 As she puts it, the majority’s approach 
“transforms a fairly prosaic regulation of commerce into what sounds 
like a civil rights case.”146 Indeed, she adds that “[r]eading the opinion 
one might be forgiven for thinking that this was a civil rights case 
rather than an issue of regulated pharmaceutical sales practices.”147 
The implications of this approach, as Professor Charlotte Garden 
notes, are that it “enables new arguments that . . . heightened scrutiny 
should apply to regulation targeting a particular set of commercial 
actors who are doing business via speech.”148 
Read more broadly, Sorrell falls in line with what attorney 
Richard Samp calls “a remarkable trend in First Amendment 
jurisprudence over the past 30 years. In recent years, the Court’s 
conservative justices have been far more likely than its liberal ones to 
strike down government speech restrictions on First Amendment 
grounds.”149 And if, as Professor Amanda Shanor notes, “the First 
Amendment has become the key battleground for challenging the 
powers of the modern administrative state,”150 then Sorrell marks a key 
successful challenge that, as Part III reveals, paves that path for the 
2018 decisions in both Becerra and Janus.151 
II. TIERS OF SCRUTINY UNDER ATTACK: JUSTICE BREYER’S 
PROPORTIONALITY APPROACH  
 
Adding to the confusion over when a case involving speech 
merits heightened scrutiny and when it entails only rational basis 
review is Justice Stephen Breyer’s First Amendment philosophy. 
Breyer, who penned both the 2011 dissent in Sorrell discussed 
above152 and the 2018 dissent in Becerra addressed below,153 views 
                                                   
 145. Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of 
Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
 146. Id. at 4-5.  
 147. Id. at 15. 
 148. Garden, supra note 72, at 337. 
 149. Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or 
Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129. 
 150. Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 
322 (2018). 
 151. See infra Part III. 
 152. See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s 
dissent in Sorrell). 
 153. See infra notes 307–327 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s 
dissent in Becerra). 
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freedom of speech as “a malleable concept.”154 He perceives the First 
Amendment as “an elastic amendment, expanding and contracting 
depending on the interests that each side asserted for the dispute 
currently before the Court. Through proportionality testing, Breyer 
typically will determine if, in his estimation, the government’s ends 
justify the means employed to achieve these goals.”155  
More precisely, as Breyer defined it in a Second Amendment 
case,156 the bottom-line question is “whether the statute imposes 
burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate 
objectives, are disproportionate.”157 He explained in his book Making 
Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View that “[p]roportionality 
involves balancing.”158 He added that it “is specially designed for a 
context where important constitutional rights and interests conflict” 
and “useful when a statute restricts one constitutionally protected 
interest in order to further some other comparably important 
interest.”159 For example, in a 2001 case pitting free speech interests 
against privacy concerns, Breyer described his proportionality of 
harms-benefits balancing approach as: 
[A]sk[ing] whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their 
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead 
impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured 
against their corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into 
account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as 
the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits?160 
                                                   
 154. Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer’s Fluid Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 507 (2016). 
 155. Id.  
 156. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a] well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second 
Amendment has been incorporated by the Supreme Court to apply to state and local 
government entities and officials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding “that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second 
Amendment right” as recognized by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008)). 
 157. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 158. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
164 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 163-65.  
 160. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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Proportionality is popular in other legal systems, including those 
of European nations,161 but not in U.S. Constitutional law162 or in First 
Amendment jurisprudence163—unless the justice in question is named 
Breyer.164 Or as veteran First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams 
recently put it, Breyer “has offered interpretations of the First 
Amendment that appear to me to be closer to those adopted in 
European nations in interpreting their more limited free speech 
protections under the European Convention on Human Rights.”165 
Breyer disdains a rigid categorical approach to First Amendment 
jurisprudence in which content-based laws typically are subject to 
strict scrutiny review while content-neutral laws face intermediate 
scrutiny.166 For example, Breyer wrote in his 2015 concurrence in Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert that: 
                                                   
 161. See Mark S. Kende, The Unmasking of Balancing and Proportionality 
Review in U.S. Constitutional Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 417, 424 (2017) 
(noting that “proportionality review took the world by storm after World War II with 
many nations having a key case, except the U.S.”). 
 162. Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial 
Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2361 (2017) 
(“[P]roportionality doctrine is not viewed as a general measure of rights violations in 
the United States, nor is proportionality treated as a general principle of U.S. 
constitutional law.”). 
 163. As Harvard Professor Vicki Jackson summarizes it,  
“Proportionality” is today accepted as a general principle of law by 
constitutional courts and international tribunals around the world. 
“Proportionality review,” a structured form of doctrine, now flows across 
national lines, a seemingly common methodology for evaluating many 
constitutional and human rights claims. The United States is often viewed 
as an outlier in this transnational embrace of proportionality in 
constitutional law.  
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 
3094, 3096 (2015). 
 164. See Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies, Judges as Diplomats in Advancing 
the Rule of Law: A Conversation With President Koen Lenaerts and Justice Stephen 
Breyer, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2017) (noting that “Justice Breyer has restated 
the case for the judge . . . to learn from foreign legal ideas, particularly the European 
constitutional concept of proportionality when adjudicating on the First 
Amendment”). 
 165. Floyd Abrams, Keynote Remarks, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future 
of the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (2016). 
 166. As Professor Dan Kozlowski tidily encapsulates it,  
The approach to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by the 
Supreme Court of the United States depends heavily on categorical analysis. 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has recognized three categories of regulations 
on expression: content neutral, content based, and viewpoint based. 
Whether a regulation will be upheld depends in large measure on the 
Court’s initial determination of the category to which it belongs. The Court 
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The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the 
Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for 
regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as “content 
discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my view, the 
category “content discrimination” is better considered in many contexts, 
including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic “strict 
scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.167 
The same year Reed was decided, Breyer penned a two-sentence 
concurrence in the free speech case of Williams-Yulee v. Florida 
Bar.168 Breyer’s opinion was devoted solely to reiterating his view that 
“this Court’s doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny [are] guidelines 
informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be 
mechanically applied.”169 In a nutshell, as Professor Lillian R. BeVier 
observes, “Justice Breyer has unambiguously announced his intention 
to reshape First Amendment doctrine.”170  
Breyer responds to the concern that proportionality gives judges 
too much discretion by pointing out that “a judge who uses such an 
approach must examine and explain all the factors that go into a 
decision. The need for that examination and explanation serves as a 
constraint. It means the decision must be transparent and subject to 
criticism.”171 
Beyond bridling against a tiers-of-scrutiny approach,172 Breyer 
focuses on the First Amendment’s “expressive objectives” in the 
quotation above from Reed.173 He foreshadows his remarks in Becerra 
noted above about potentially reserving heightened scrutiny for cases 
in which certain “First Amendment goals” and “the true value of 
                                                   
has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral regulations 
(strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient intermediate 
scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral), but it has said that 
viewpoint-based regulations are unconstitutional.  
Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget 
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131-32 (2008).  
 167. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 168. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice 
Breyer be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1283 (2005). 
 171. BREYER, supra note 158, at 170. 
 172. Cf. Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a 
Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate 
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2031 (2015) (noting that in Reed, 
“Breyer rejected a one-size-fits-all approach to First Amendment jurisprudence”).  
 173. Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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protecting freedom of speech” are at stake.174 In Making Our 
Democracy Work: A Judge’s View, Breyer elaborates that “[v]alues 
are the constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”175 
Constitutional values, for Breyer, are neither fleeting nor ephemeral.176 
Instead, they are “deep, enduring,” and “change little over time.”177 
When it comes to free speech, he offers one example: “[T]he 
expressive values underlying the First Amendment’s speech 
protection tell us that the amendment strongly protects political speech 
over the Internet while offering little if any protection to Internet fraud 
schemes.”178 In other words, traditional values—protecting political 
speech, to use Breyer’s example—can be applied to modern 
technologies, such as the Internet. 
The bottom line is that Breyer is engaged in what Professor Mark 
Tushnet calls a project of the “partial de-doctrinalization of the First 
Amendment.”179 To wit, Professors Vikram David Amar and Alan 
Brownstein contend that Breyer’s concurrence in the Stolen Valor Act 
case of United States v. Alvarez “was written as if there were no formal 
free speech doctrine currently in use that constrains judges’ 
assessments of free speech claims.”180 Breyer’s willingness to break 
free from—or at least to loosen up—the chains of First Amendment 
doctrine thus facilitates today’s confusion about when a law affecting 
speech merits heightened scrutiny and when it is tested by rational 
basis review. Thus, it is not surprising that he wrote both the dissent 
in Sorrell181 and, as discussed in the next Part of this Article, the dissent 
in Becerra.182 And all of this doctrinal blurriness is compounded by 
the Court’s penchant under Chief Justice Roberts’s leadership for 
avoidance and minimalism which, “along with political partisanship, 
                                                   
 174. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382-
83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 175. BREYER, supra note 158, at 162. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 179. Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of 
Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014). 
 180. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First 
Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 491, 497 (2013). Along the lines of proportionality, Breyer reasoned in Alvarez 
that the Stolen Valor Act “works disproportionate constitutional harm.” United States 
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 739 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 181. See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell). 
 182. See infra notes 307-327 and accompanying text (addressing Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Becerra). 
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have detrimentally affected multiple First Amendment doctrines 
during the past five years.”183  
With this background in mind, the Article next turns to three 
Supreme Court decisions—one from 2017 and two from 2018.184 They 
reveal, in one manner or another, the division on the Court between 
when and whether heightened First Amendment scrutiny is warranted 
for cases affecting speech. 
III. TODAY’S DIVIDE ON SPEECH AND SCRUTINY: A TRIO OF KEY 
DECISIONS 
 
This Part has three Sections, each of which separately examines 
facets of one of three recent Supreme Court rulings that reveal possible 
reasons for the current fracturing among the justices on standards of 
scrutiny in cases impacting free expression. The cases are, in the order 
addressed below and dating from the oldest to most recent decision, 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,185 National Institute of 
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra186 and Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.187 Rather than 
analyzing all issues and aspects of this trio of cases, this Part 
concentrates on the justices’ battle over the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny and how much deference is due from the Court to the 
legislative body in scrutinizing the statutes at issue. 
A. Expressions Hair Design 
In March 2017, the Supreme Court in Expressions Hair Design 
v. Schneiderman held that a New York statute banning merchants in 
the Empire State from imposing surcharges on customers who pay 
with a credit card rather than cash raised First Amendment-based 
                                                   
 183. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal 
Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of 
Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 943, 990 
(2016). A complete discussion of avoidance and minimalism is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 184. See infra Part III. 
 185. See generally Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017). 
 186. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 187. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. 
Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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speech issues.188 In doing so, the Court reversed the opinion of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had held that the 
statute merely regulated economic conduct, not speech.189 
Expressions Hair Design thus is important for purposes of this 
Article because it exposes the tension among the justices in separating 
speech cases from conduct cases and, in turn, separating statutes 
meriting heightened review from those deserving rational basis 
review. Subsection 1 concentrates on facets of the majority opinion in 
Expressions Hair Design that illustrate this strain, while Subsection 2 
focuses on Justice Stephen Breyer’s solo concurrence. 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s opinion and was 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan.190 
Although this clustering of justices bridged conservatives and liberals, 
Roberts’s opinion nonetheless is important here because it 
demonstrates how the Court had to grapple with determining whether 
a statute involved speech or merely conduct. 
Underlying the law at issue in Expressions Hair Design are the 
transaction fees—commonly known as swipe fees—that credit card 
companies charge merchants each time customers use a credit card to 
pay for a good or service.191 How do merchants deal with these fees if 
they want to recoup them? They have three options.192 Specifically, 
                                                   
 188. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2017) (providing, in pertinent 
part, that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who 
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means”); 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017) (concluding 
that the New York anti-surcharge statute “does regulate speech” and remanding case 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second to determine the statute’s constitutionality).  
 189. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (concluding that the statute “does not regulate speech as applied to single-
sticker-price sellers”), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 190. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1146. Justice Sotomayor authored 
a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Alito. See id. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). A discussion of Sotomayor’s opinion, which focused on certification of 
the statutory question, is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id. at 1153-
59. 
 191. Clay Calvert et al., Speech v. Conduct, Surcharges v. Discounts: Testing 
the Limits of the First Amendment and Statutory Construction in the Growing Credit 
Card Quagmire, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 157 (2017) (“When 
merchants accept a customer’s credit card, they are contractually obligated to pay a 
percentage of the transaction total—a swipe fee—to the credit card company (e.g., 
Visa, MasterCard, or American Express).”). 
 192. See id. 
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they “can raise sticker prices to make up the difference; pass on some 
or all of the swipe fee directly to their customers via a surcharge for 
credit card purchases; or offer an incentive, such as a discount, to 
encourage customers to pay with cash.”193 
The New York statute at issue in Expressions Hair Design, 
however, banned that second option.194 Specifically, it provided: “[n]o 
seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who 
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar 
means.”195 By its terms, the statute appears to regulate only a 
commercial transaction, and it leaves merchants free to give discounts 
to customers who choose to pay with cash.196 How, then, does a 
possible First Amendment issue come into play? It does so when 
merchants attempt to communicate with or talk to customers about the 
difference between prices being charged.197 As Professor Mark 
Chenoweth explains: 
The problem arises when a merchant wishes to characterize the price 
difference as a “surcharge” for credit. Whether such a merchant wishes to 
explain why it charges more to its customers using credit cards, to deter 
credit purchases, or simply to be free from government dictates, the 
dilemma remains the same: Is this dispute about speech or merely conduct, 
and, if the former, does the First Amendment protect the merchant’s 
speech?198 
More specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
statute raised a First Amendment-based speech issue as applied to a 
particular “single-sticker pricing”  scenario—one in which a merchant 
posts a price on a product and then notes that a surcharge, either in the 
form of a percentage or a specific amount more than the sticker price, 
will be imposed for customers using a credit card.199 This is distinct 
                                                   
 193. Id.  
 194. See generally N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2017). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151 (“What the law does 
regulate is how sellers may communicate their prices.”). 
 198. Mark Chenoweth, Expressions Hair Design: Detangling the 
Commercial-Free-Speech Knot, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227, 227-28. 
 199. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1148; see also id. at 1149 
(“Although the merchants have presented a wide array of hypothetical pricing 
regimes, they have expressly identified only one pricing scheme that they seek to 
employ: posting a cash price and an additional credit card surcharge, expressed either 
as a percentage surcharge or a ‘dollars-and-cents’ additional amount.”). 
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from a merchant posting two separate prices—one for cash, one for 
credit.200  
The Supreme Court agreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s determination that the New York statute banned 
the single-sticker pricing scenario described immediately above.201 
The Supreme Court, however, soon parted ways after that with the 
Second Circuit on whether this ban, in fact, affected the speech of 
merchants. The Second Circuit had found that the statute “posed no 
First Amendment problem because . . . [it] regulate[d] conduct, not 
speech.”202 Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that the sticker 
price must be the same as or equal to the price a customer would pay 
using a credit card and that this was “simply a conduct regulation.”203 
Chief Justice Roberts and the majority, weighing into the 
question of whether the First Amendment was implicated, disagreed. 
In doing so, they delved into—just as the majority had in Sorrell204—
whether any burden imposed on the speech of merchants was 
“incidental” to the statute’s “primary effect on conduct.”205 Roberts 
explained that the burden would be incidental if all that the statute did 
was “regulate the amount that a store could collect” for selling a 
particular item, such as specifying that “all New York delis to charge 
$10 for their sandwiches.”206 
This, the majority concluded, was not the case with New York’s 
anti-charge law because merchants were freely allowed to sell any 
item at any price.207 Instead, the majority found that the statute: 
[Impacted] how sellers may communicate their prices. A merchant who 
wants to charge $10 for cash and $10.30 for credit may not convey that price 
any way he pleases. He is not free to say “$10, with a 3% credit card 
surcharge” or “$10, plus $0.30 for credit” because both of those displays 
                                                   
 200. See id. at 1149. A two-price scenario would involve a merchant posting 
“separate dollars-and-cents prices for cash and credit” such as “$10 cash, $10.30 
credit.” Id. at 1149, n.1. 
 201. See id. at 1149-50.  
 202. Id. at 1150. 
 203. Id.  
 204. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567, 570 (2011); supra 
notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing Sorrell’s consideration of whether 
the statute in that case imposed an incidental burden on speech or something more). 
 205. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
 206. Id. at 1150. 
 207. Id. at 1151 (“The law tells merchants nothing about the amount they are 
allowed to collect from a cash or credit card payer. Sellers are free to charge $10 for 
cash and $9.70, $10, $10.30, or any other amount for credit.”). 
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identify a single sticker price—$10—that is less than the amount credit card 
users will be charged.208 
While the majority thus found that speech was at issue, it did 
little else beyond remanding the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit to evaluate Expressions Hair Design as a speech 
case.209 It did not, for instance, decide what level of scrutiny should 
apply on remand.210 Furthermore, as Professor Amanda Shanor points 
out, “the Court declined to articulate broader rules about how courts 
should identify ‘speech’ for constitutional purposes.”211 
2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
While the Supreme Court’s ruling came without dissent, Justice 
Breyer issued a brief but important concurring opinion openly 
questioning the importance of separating speech from conduct and 
reiterating portions of his assertions in Sorrell.212 As Breyer put it, “it 
is often wiser not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and 
‘conduct’” “because virtually all government regulation affects 
speech.”213 More colloquially, Breyer was willing to stipulate that 
speech was involved in Expressions Hair Design because almost all 
interactions between humans involve speech at some level.214 Thus, 
rather than focusing on whether speech is involved, the better 
approach, Breyer contended, is to ask whether the law at issue “affects 
an interest that the First Amendment protects.”215 
What does this mean? Breyer explained that if a law “negatively 
affects the processes through which political discourse or public 
opinion is formed or expressed (interests close to the First 
Amendment’s protective core), courts normally scrutinize that 
regulation with great care.”216 In this statement, he avoids using the 
term “strict scrutiny” that typically applies in political speech cases,217 
                                                   
 208. Id.  
 209. See id.  
 210. See id.  
 211. Shanor, supra note 150, at 333. 
 212. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. (“Human relations take place through speech.”). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in 2010, “political speech must 
prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws 
that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the 
Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is 
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thereby dodging any possible embracement of a traditional doctrinal 
standard and leaving one to wonder if “great care” is synonymous with 
strict scrutiny or if it means something else.  
Importantly, and as noted in the Introduction218 and as discussed 
later in Becerra,219 this approach also tracks Breyer’s efforts to limit 
the application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny—
specifically, what one typically calls strict scrutiny—to cases only in 
which the regulated speech directly serves certain values, such as 
facilitating “the processes through which political discourse or public 
opinion is formed or expressed.”220 In other words, Breyer intimates 
that the benchmark for determining when strict scrutiny applies is not 
to see if the law in question is content based, but instead to determine 
if the law affects some important value residing at “the First 
Amendment’s protective core.”221 This values-based approach later 
blossoms in Becerra in 2018. There, Breyer suggests that heightened 
scrutiny should come into play only when the “true value of protecting 
freedom of speech” is at stake, such as safeguarding unpopular views 
and facilitating the truth-seeking function of speech in the marketplace 
of ideas but not when speech is impacted by “economic and social 
laws that legislatures long would have thought themselves free to 
enact.”222 
Next, Breyer added that “[i]f the challenged regulation restricts 
the ‘informational function’ provided by truthful commercial speech, 
courts will apply a ‘lesser’ (but still elevated) form of scrutiny.”223 Just 
as he stopped short of using the term “strict scrutiny” when it came to 
speech affecting political discourse, here too Breyer avoided using the 
term “intermediate scrutiny”—the traditional doctrinal classification 
for speech regulated under the commercial speech doctrine.224  
Breyer then wrote that “a more permissive standard of review” 
applies when the government compels commercial speakers to 
disclose factual and uncontroversial information because such 
                                                   
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
 218. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 219. See infra notes 312, 316 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 221. Id.  
 222. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382-
83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 223. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (addressing the commercial 
speech doctrine). 
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regulations have “only a ‘minimal’ effect on First 
Amendment interests.”225 This permissive standard, he added, is one 
of reasonableness.226 Finally, Breyer opined that “a similarly 
permissive standard of review” of rational basis review applies to laws 
targeting “ordinary commercial transactions” because such 
“legislation normally does not significantly affect the interests that the 
First Amendment protects.”227 
Citing his own dissent in Sorrell for support, Breyer resolved 
that determining which one of the above standards was “the proper 
approach is typically more important than trying to distinguish 
‘speech’ from ‘conduct.’”228 Expressions Hair Design afforded Breyer 
the opportunity to make this point because it was “not clear just what 
New York’s law [did].”229 He ultimately passed on choosing what 
standard should apply, however, because the statute’s interpretation 
was properly “a matter of state law.”230 
Ultimately, Breyer’s approach to resolving the appropriate level 
of scrutiny concentrates “on the communicative interest at stake, on a 
sliding scale of the speech’s importance, with political speech 
receiving high protections and speech in ‘ordinary’ business 
transactions very little.”231 Just as Sorrell did, Expressions Hair 
Design afforded Breyer the chance to voice “his view that the 
Supreme Court has entered dangerous territory in subjecting laws 
regulating economic matters to heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny.”232  
For Breyer, then, the key question is not whether speech is 
involved in any given case because speech almost inevitably is 
involved.233 Therefore, exerting time and effort sorting out speech 
                                                   
 225. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. (quoting United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
(1938)). 
 228. Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting)). 
 229. Id. at 1153. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Matthew Moloshok, Fuzzy Rules, Expressions Hair Design v. 
Schneiderman, and Ohio v. American Express, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 
2018, at 1-3. 
 232. Adam Liptak, Justices Side with Free-Speech Challenge to Credit Card 
Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/ 
supreme-court-credit-card-fees.html [https://perma.cc/WKY2-4LWZ]. 
 233. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 107 
from conduct is a waste of judicial time.234 The weightier issue, 
instead, is determining what value the speech serves, as measured 
against a hierarchy of First Amendment reasons for protecting speech 
from government control.235 If, in other words, one determines that 
safeguarding the speech at issue would serve or facilitate a core First 
Amendment value, then either a more rigorous standard of scrutiny or 
a more searching analysis should apply to better protect it against 
unnecessary government control or censorship.236 
And by not affixing labels like strict scrutiny or intermediate 
scrutiny in Expressions Hair Design to the top two levels of review, 
Breyer intimates a more fluid approach akin to proportionality.237 It is 
a tack under which the focus is not so much on whether the 
government has a compelling238 or a significant239 interest in regulating 
the speech or whether the law regulating is content based240 or content 
neutral241 but instead on whether the speech being regulated serves a 
sufficiently high value on the First Amendment totem to warrant a law 
undergoing a more rigorous review.242 The starting point of analysis 
thus is not necessarily whether a law serves a particular government 
                                                   
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II 
(addressing proportionality as conceptualized by Justice Breyer). 
 238. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) 
(explaining a statute must be “justified by a compelling government interest” under 
strict scrutiny). 
 239. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) 
(explaining that under intermediate scrutiny the government typically must prove that 
it has a significant interest). 
 240. Under traditional principles of First Amendment law, “[c]ontent-based 
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are 
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
395 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)). 
 241. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (observing that 
the government is afforded “somewhat wider leeway to regulate features of speech 
unrelated to its content,” and explaining that the government must prove that a 
content-neutral regulation of speech is narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest 
and that the regulation leaves open ample alternative means for communicating the 
information in question). 
 242. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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interest but whether the speech serves a particular First Amendment 
value.243 
B. Becerra 
In June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court in Becerra held that two 
parts of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, 
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) codified in 
the state’s Health and Safety Code likely violated the First 
Amendment.244 One part245 applied to licensed crisis pregnancy 
centers.246 The other247 affected unlicensed crisis pregnancy centers.248 
Both facets, however, mandated the communication of government 
messages.249 
The centers to which these provisions applied advocated against 
abortion250 and were “often affiliated with religious groups.”251 More 
                                                   
 243. See id. 
 244. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 
(2018) (“We hold that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim 
that the FACT Act violates the First Amendment.”); see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 
123472 (2016) (providing the two aspects of the FACT Act at issue and struck down 
by the Supreme Court in Becerra). 
 245. See § 123472(a). 
 246. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123471(a) (2016) (providing the criteria 
for defining a licensed center). 
 247. § 123472(b) (2016). 
 248. See id. (providing the criteria for defining an unlicensed center). 
 249. See §§ 123471(a)-(b). 
 250. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Takes Case on Free Speech Rights of 
Antiabortion Counseling Centers, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-case-on-
free-speech-rights-of-antiabortion-counseling-centers/2017/11/13/cd2003f8-c882-
11e7-aa96-54417592cf72_story.html?utm_term=.7c1e267f7d15 
[https://perma.cc/YU6W-3ESQ] (reporting that crisis pregnancy centers “counsel 
against abortion” and “provide services for pregnant women and try to persuade them 
not to end their pregnancies”); Adam Liptak, Justices Take Cases on Free Speech at 
Pregnancy Centers and Polling Places, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/us/politics/supreme-court-first-amendment-
pregnancy-voting.html [https:/perma.cc/8N2X-EJFA] (“The centers seek to persuade 
women to choose parenting or adoption.”). 
 251. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Warily Eyes California Law Involving 
Abortion and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/20/us/politics/supreme-court-abortion-free-speech-crisis-pregnancy-
centers.html [https://perma.cc/J5GK-V9UK]. 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 109 
provocatively parsed by one critic, the centers “spew[ed] 
misinformation, if not downright lies.”252 
Under California law, licensed crisis pregnancy centers must 
disseminate to clients on their premises the following message: 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-
cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all 
FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion 
for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the 
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”253 
Unlicensed centers are compelled to post a message on their premises 
explaining they are not licensed as medical facilities by California and 
do not have licensed medical providers.254 Additionally, unlicensed 
facilities are required to publish that same information “in any print 
and digital advertising materials including Internet Web sites” in both 
English and other languages.255 
As framed by Justice Clarence Thomas in the majority opinion, 
the issue was whether the “notice requirements violate[d] the First 
Amendment.”256 The centers objected to the law primarily because, as 
the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) asserted, 
California’s “compelled speech requirement drown[ed] out the 
centers’ pro-life messages.”257 NIFLA also complained because 
“California impose[d] this compelled speech only on centers that 
oppose[d] abortion.”258 Put more emphatically in a later NIFLA brief, 
the organization argued that “California forces pro-life licensed 
centers to point the way to free or low-cost abortions, making those 
centers complicit in facilitating an act they believe hurts women and 
destroys innocent lives.”259 
                                                   
 252. Robin Abcarian, The Supreme Court Puts Religion-Based Dishonesty 
Above the Health and Welfare of Vulnerable Pregnant Women, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 
2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-abcarian-abortion-scotus-
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 253. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123472(a)(1) (2016). 
 254. § 123472(b)(1) (“The notice shall state: ‘This facility is not licensed as a 
medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical provider who 
provides or directly supervises the provision of services.’”). 
 255. § 123472(b). The specific other languages were based upon “the primary 
threshold languages for Medi-Cal beneficiaries as determined by the State Department 
of Health Care Services for the county in which the facility is located.” § 123472(a). 
 256. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2368 (2018). 
 257. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-
1140). 
 258. See id. at 2.  
 259. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 236 (No. 16-1140). 
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In short, NIFLA asserted that both requirements violated the 
unenumerated First Amendment right not to speak.260 That right was 
established more than seventy-five years ago in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette.261 The Court held there that public-
school students could not be compelled either to pledge allegiance to 
the United States or to engage in the symbolic expression of saluting 
the American flag.262  
This implied First Amendment right was later developed in cases 
such as Wooley v. Maynard,263 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo264 and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group.265 However, the parameters of the right not to speak remain 
ambiguous. As Professor Nat Stern asserts, “the right to resist 
                                                   
 260. Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer 
“Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 432 (2016) (“The right to speak and the right 
not to speak are ‘complementary.’”); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
257, at 15-17. 
 261. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
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individuals to display a motto on government-required license plates that “is 
repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.” Id. at 707. 
 264. See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) 
(providing further clarification on the right not to speak). In Tornillo, the Court struck 
down a Florida right-of-reply statute that compelled newspapers in the Sunshine State 
to give free space in their pages to political candidates who had either their personal 
character or official record assailed by those newspapers. See id. at 243-44. The Court 
reasoned that “[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made 
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues 
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment.” Id. at 258. 
 265. See generally Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (discussing the “right to speak” in a contemporary context). In 
Hurley, the Court held that private citizens who organize a parade cannot be 
compelled by the government to include in that parade “a group imparting a message 
the organizers do not wish to convey.” Id. at 559. 
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governmentally imposed expressive activities has evolved into a 
sprawling and ungainly doctrine.”266  
In Becerra, and regarding the notice requirement at licensed 
facilities, NIFLA argued that: 
California now forces licensed centers to communicate the government’s 
message about state-funded abortions to everyone who walks in the door. 
The State, rather than using countless alternative ways to communicate its 
message, including its own powerful voice, instead compels only licensed 
facilities that help women consider alternatives to abortion to express the 
government’s message regarding how to obtain abortions paid for by the 
State.267 
As for the requirement that unlicensed centers include 
disclaimers in all advertisements and in different languages that they 
are not licensed medical facilities, NIFLA averred that the mandate 
“ma[de] ads so long that it [was] difficult, if not impossible, for 
unlicensed centers to advocate their own pro-life message in most 
media, like bus or newspaper ads.”268 NIFLA also contended that the 
“disclaimers force[d] the unlicensed centers to begin their expressive 
relationship with an immediate unwanted or negative message that 
crowd[ed] out and confuse[d] their intended message. The 
law effectively suppresse[d] their speech based on its viewpoint 
opposing abortion.”269 
California and its attorney general, Xavier Becerra, countered 
that the compelled speech obligation at licensed centers educated 
women about the availability of free or low-cost abortion services.270 
This, in turn, would allow them to make informed choices concerning 
their pregnancy options.271 As California’s initial brief to the Court put 
it:  
[The notice requirement] ensures that low-income women who are or may 
be pregnant have the information they need in order to seek, if they wish, 
the time-sensitive comprehensive medical care that is available through 
                                                   
 266. See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 
BUFF. L. REV. 847, 849 (2011). 
 267. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 16. 
 268. Id. at 16-17.  
 269. Id. at 17. 
 270. See Brief for State Respondents at 5-6, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16–1140). 
 271. See id. (asserting that “each year thousands of women are unaware 
of relevant public health programs when they learn that they are pregnant,” and adding 
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public programs. The statute is designed to reach an audience in need of 
such information at a critical moment.272 
  In terms of requiring disclaimers in ads for (and on the premises 
of) unlicensed clinics that they had no license to provide medical 
services, California argued that women should be able to know what 
kind of services a center does or does not offer.273 Additionally, 
California contended that “[t]he First Amendment does not bar States 
from advancing that interest by requiring service providers to disclose 
a neutral statement of fact regarding the existence or not of a 
governmental license.”274 
The big-picture issue facing the Supreme Court was whether the 
compelled speech obligations imposed on both licensed and 
unlicensed facilities violated the First Amendment right not to 
speak.275 Yet, the critical underlying issue—the one of particular 
importance for this Article—was the level of scrutiny against which 
the FACT Act’s provisions should be measured. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2016 upheld both parts in a unanimous 
three-judge decision.276 It concluded that intermediate scrutiny 
supplied the appropriate test for the provision affecting licensed 
clinics.277 It reasoned that intermediate scrutiny applied to the notice 
requirement at licensed centers because the statute affected so-called 
professional speech.278 This, as the Ninth Circuit defined it, is “speech 
that occurs between professionals and their clients in the context of 
their professional relationship.”279 In Becerra, the court specified that 
“the Licensed Notice regulates the clinics’ speech in the context of 
medical treatment, counseling, or advertising.”280 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                   
 272. Id. at 15. 
 273. See id.  
 274. Id.  
 275. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 
(2018) (“The question in this case is whether these notice requirements violate the 
First Amendment.”). 
 276. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 845 
(9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 
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 278. Id. at 840 (“Because licensed clinics offer medical and clinical services 
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 279. Id. at 839. 
 280. Id. at 840. 
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found that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the speech 
affected by the law was not part of a larger “public dialogue.”281  
In terms of the required notice provision affecting unlicensed 
clinics, the Ninth Circuit did not resolve what level of scrutiny was 
appropriate.282 Instead, it held that the provision would pass 
constitutional muster even under the most rigorous level of review, 
strict scrutiny.283  
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling on both provisions.284 It held that “petitioners [were] likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the 
First Amendment.”285 Yet in doing so, the justices divided five to 
four—along perceived conservative and liberal lines—on the 
applicable level of scrutiny and, importantly, on how that level of 
scrutiny should be determined.286 
This Article concentrates on the battle over scrutiny regarding 
the licensed-centers mandate. Why? First, that fight provides a clear 
window into the contrasting approaches for determining scrutiny, 
thereby rendering analysis of the unlicensed-centers requirement 
unnecessary for this Article’s focus, which is on the conflicting 
approaches for determining when heightened scrutiny is warranted. 
Second, and more importantly, the Becerra majority punted on the 
level of scrutiny question as applied to the unlicensed-centers 
provision.287 It simply held that California’s mandate for those 
facilities could not survive even under a deferential rational basis 
approach.288 
When it came to the compelled-notice requirement for licensed 
centers, the five-justice majority, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Thomas: 
  
                                                   
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. at 844 n.10 (“To be clear, we do not conclude that strict scrutiny is the 
correct level of scrutiny to apply to the Unlicensed Notice. We only conclude that it 
can survive strict scrutiny.”). 
 283. See id. at 843. 
 284. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2378 (2018). 
 285. Id.  
 286. See id. at 2361-62. 
 287. See id. at 2376-77. 
 288. Id. (“The parties dispute whether the unlicensed notice is subject to 
deferential review under Zauderer. We need not decide whether the Zauderer standard 
applies to the unlicensed notice.”). 
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1)  Held that the provision “regulate[d] speech as speech,” was 
“a content-based regulation” and therefore was 
presumptively unconstitutional and typically would be 
subject to a “stringent standard” of review tantamount to 
strict scrutiny;289 
2) Found it unnecessary, however, to apply strict scrutiny 
because the notice requirement could not “survive even 
intermediate scrutiny;”290 
3) Reasoned that the requirement could not surmount 
intermediate scrutiny because, even assuming that California 
had a substantial interest in educating low-income women 
about the availability of free or low-cost abortion services, 
the requirement was “not sufficiently drawn to achieve it” 
due to its underinclusiveness;291 
4)  Rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the requirement 
should be treated as a regulation of “professional speech” and 
thereby afforded more deferential review;292  
5) Rebuffed the argument that the requirement should be 
reviewed under the “lower level of scrutiny” established in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which involved 
a rule compelling attorneys to disclose “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” about contingency fee 
arrangements in their advertisements;293 and lastly 
                                                   
 289. Id. at 2371, 2374. 
 290. Id. at 2375. 
 291. Id. at 2375-76. See generally Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First 
Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 
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 292. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-72. The majority added that “neither 
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rejected Zauderer’s applicability, writing that “[t]he Zauderer standard does not apply 
here.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.  
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6) Rejected the notion that the requirement was simply a 
regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally 
affected speech.294 
 
In summary, the majority applied a heightened level of inquiry—
intermediate scrutiny—greater than rational basis review to strike 
down the notice requirement for licensed centers.295 In reaching that 
result, the majority’s analysis focused heavily on whether the 
provision was content based (yes, it concluded) and whether, in turn, 
any exception—be it a professional speech exception, a professional 
conduct exception, or Zauderer’s compelled-disclosure exception—
applied to exempt the provision from analysis under strict scrutiny that 
typically applies to content-based laws (no, it concluded).296  
The majority tossed California (and, by extension, the liberal 
justices) a tiny legal bone by not shutting the door on the possibility 
that a persuasive reason may, under some scenario, exist “for treating 
professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from 
ordinary First Amendment principles.”297 One of those ordinary 
principles, of course, is that whether a law is content based or content 
neutral is key for determining the level of scrutiny.298 Another is that 
content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and typically 
subject to a “stringent standard” of review akin to strict scrutiny.299 
The majority, however, quickly yanked that bone away. It held 
not only that California failed to prove such a reason in Becerra, but 
that even if it had done so, it would not have mattered because the 
                                                   
 294. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (“The licensed notice at issue here is not an 
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government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward 
the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)). 
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compelled-notice requirement for licensed centers failed the more 
permissive, yet still heightened, intermediate scrutiny test.300  
Finally, it is important to note how Justice Thomas used Sorrell 
in Becerra.301 Specifically, he cited it to support the proposition that 
content-based regulations of speech affecting the fields of health and 
medicine are dangerous and thus should be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny.302 Additionally, Thomas deployed Sorrell to seemingly rebut 
the notion espoused by Justice Breyer in Expressions Hair Design303 
and in his Becerra dissent304 that drawing a line between speech and 
conduct was no longer important.305 Finally, the majority cited Sorrell 
to support the idea that laws that distinguish between speakers merit 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.306 In a nutshell, then, Sorrell 
became a vehicle for turning Becerra into a full-blown First 
Amendment case demanding heightened scrutiny. 
Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by fellow liberal Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, held that both provisions of the 
FACT Act were “likely constitutional.”307 In doing so, Breyer:  
 
1) Blasted the majority’s approach for determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny, claiming it “threatens to create 
serious problems;”308  
2)  Objected to the majority’s application of what Breyer called 
“heightened scrutiny” to the mandate affecting licensed 
centers simply because the FACT Act was a content-based 
restriction of speech, with Breyer emphasizing that 
“[v]irtually every disclosure law could be considered 
‘content based;’”309  
                                                   
 300. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 301. See id. at 2374. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See supra notes 21-24, 228 and accompanying text (describing Breyer’s 
views in Expressions Hair Design on the relationship between speech and conduct).  
 304. See infra note 346 and accompanying text (describing Breyer’s views in 
Becerra on the relationship between speech and conduct). 
 305. See generally Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
U.S. 552, 553 (2011) (explaining that while drawing the line between speech and 
conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long drawn it). 
 306. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 307. See id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 308. Id. at 2380. 
 309. Id. 
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3)  Spelled out a virtual parade of horribles, just as he had done 
in dissent in Sorrell,310 regarding “the constitutional validity 
of much, perhaps most, government regulation” involving 
compelled disclosures;311 and  
4)  Rebuked the majority both for “suggesting that heightened 
scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation” 
and for causing “serious disservice” to traditional First 
Amendment goals, such as discovering truth in the 
marketplace of ideas and protecting unpopular ideas, by 
invoking them in the name of applying heightened scrutiny 
in Becerra.312  
 
Just as he did in dissent in Sorrell,313 Breyer raised the possibility 
that the majority’s nondeferential approach in Becerra represented a 
return to the Lochner era.314 For the dissent, applying heightened 
scrutiny in Becerra contradicts the traditional deference and 
“respectful approach” due to legislative bodies when regulating 
“ordinary economic and social legislation” and the medical 
profession.315 Ramping up First Amendment scrutiny when it is 
unnecessary to do so ultimately causes long-term harm by clouding 
what Breyer called “the true value of protecting freedom of speech.”316  
In other words, and as suggested earlier, Breyer and the dissent 
intimated that a values-based approach—rather than a content-based-
versus-content-neutral methodology—provides the better technique 
for deciding when heightened scrutiny applies in a case involving 
speech.317 Only when a value residing at the core of the First 
Amendment is jeopardized is heightened scrutiny warranted. In other 
words, as Justice Kagan wrote for the same bloc of four justices in 
                                                   
 310. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 311. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that “the 
majority’s view, if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps placing 
much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk”). 
 312. Id. at 2382-83. 
 313. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“[e]ven during the Lochner era, when this Court struck down numerous economic 
regulations concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative 
judgments concerning the medical profession,” and adding that “[i]n the name of 
the First Amendment, the majority today treads into territory where the pre-New Deal, 
as well as the post-New Deal, Court refused to go”). 
 315. Id. at 2381-82. 
 316. Id. at 2383. 
 317. See id. at 2382-83 (addressing this values-based approach to scrutiny). 
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dissent in Janus just one day after Becerra, “[t]he First Amendment 
was meant for better things” than being used as a scalpel to cut and 
carve away at “workaday economic and regulatory policy.”318 More 
bluntly stated, there is a certain amount of constitutional 
disingenuousness involved that degrades the real reasons for having a 
First Amendment Free Speech Clause when any content-based law 
affecting speech triggers heightened scrutiny, be it strict or 
intermediate.  
Breyer explained why the “majority’s general broad ‘content-
based’ test” for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny is 
misguided when it comes to disclosure laws.319 He wrote that this “test 
invites courts around the Nation to apply an unpredictable First 
Amendment to ordinary social and economic regulation, striking 
down disclosure laws that judges may disfavor, while upholding 
others, all without grounding their decisions in reasoned principle.”320 
A reasoned principle, Breyer suggested, for applying a rigorous level 
of review to disclosure laws would be if they were viewpoint based.321  
For the dissent, the level of scrutiny that should have been 
applied to the compelled-disclosure requirements for licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers was the version of rational basis review articulated 
by the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.322 Under 
that test, compelled disclosure of information is permissible under the 
First Amendment if the government’s reason for compelling speech is 
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception.”323 
This test amounts to rational basis review.324 Breyer thus wrote that 
                                                   
 318. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 319. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 320. Id.  
 321. Id. (“Notably, the majority says nothing about limiting its language to the 
kind of instance where the Court has traditionally found the First Amendment wary 
of content-based laws, namely, in cases of viewpoint discrimination.”).  
 322. See id. at 2386-87; see generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 323. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 324. Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the 
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 521 (2014) 
(emphasis added) (“Zauderer has led to considerable confusion in the lower courts 
about what sorts of commercial speech disclosure requirements are covered by its 
rational basis standard of review.”); Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate 
Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and 
commentators have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable relationship’ test as a highly 
deferential test similar to rational basis review.”); see also Danielle Weatherby & 
Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The Tobacco Control Act’s Anti-Smoking 
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“finding no First Amendment infirmity in the licensed notice is 
consistent with earlier Court rulings. For instance, in Zauderer we 
upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose in their advertisements 
that clients might be liable for significant litigation costs even if their 
lawsuits were unsuccessful.”325 
More broadly extrapolated, the dissent suggests that when a 
professional or a business is compelled by the government to reveal 
facts that possess “informational value” to patients or consumers, and 
when the government “expresses no official preference” about the 
choice or the option that patients or consumers should make with that 
information, then “[t]here is no reason to subject such laws 
to heightened scrutiny.”326 More colloquially put, a little bit of 
government intervention in the factual marketplace of ideas—
intervention in the interest of helping an audience that is confronted 
with important choices by expanding its knowledge—should not be 
measured against a heightened test. Or phrased in terms more akin to 
Breyer’s preferred proportionality method, the informational benefits 
to the audience of receiving such compelled speech are major while 
the harms to the speakers that result from being compelled to convey 
that information are minor.327 
In contrast and as noted earlier, the Becerra majority refused to 
apply Zauderer.328 Why? Because, as Justice Thomas explained by 
quoting directly from Zauderer, that test applies only to cases 
involving disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information about the terms under which . . . services will be 
available.”329 Specifically, Zauderer addressed the constitutionality of 
a state disciplinary rule compelling Ohio attorneys to reveal in their 
                                                   
Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 ALB. L. REV. 121, 138 (2012) 
(writing that the Court in Zauderer “articulated a rational basis standard of review”). 
 325. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2386–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 326. Id. at 2387-88. 
 327. Id. at 2387 (“Whether the context is advertising the professional’s own 
services or other commercial speech, a doctor’s First Amendment interest in not 
providing factual information to patients is the same: minimal, because his 
professional speech is protected precisely because of its informational value to 
patients.”). 
 328. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (addressing the majority’s 
treatment of Zauderer). 
 329. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
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advertisements certain information about their contingency fee 
arrangements.330  
Thomas distinguished that factual setting from Becerra in two 
principal ways. First, he called abortion “anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”331 While he may be correct that abortion is 
controversial, Thomas here slightly distorts or twists Zauderer’s 
language—language that focuses not on whether the underlying topic 
is uncontroversial, but on whether the information is 
uncontroversial.332 In other words, while abortion may be a 
controversial topic in some quarters, purely factual information 
regarding the price of an abortion for low-income women is arguably 
a very different matter. As Justice Breyer put it, “[a]bortion is a 
controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the 
availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a fact of 
debatable truth.”333  
The second factual distinction Justice Thomas drew in order to 
cabin Zauderer’s reach to the circumstances of that case pivoted on 
who provides the services about which information must be 
disclosed.334 In Zauderer, attorneys had to disclose information about 
the contingency fee arrangements under which they would perform 
their own services for clients.335 In Becerra, however, licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers had to provide information about abortion services 
provided by others, given that the centers do not perform abortions.336 
These two factual distinctions proved pivotal for Thomas and the 
conservative majority in holding that the rational basis test created in 
                                                   
 330. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629 (framing a key issue in the case as 
“whether a State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring 
attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee 
arrangements”). 
 331. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 332. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added) (opining that Ohio’s 
“prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in his 
advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms 
under which his services will be available”). 
 333. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 334. See id. at 2372. 
 335. See id. (emphasis added) (where Justice Thomas wrote that the 
compelled-disclosure mandate in Zauderer applied to “lawyers who advertised their 
services on a contingency-fee basis”). 
 336. See id. at 2371-72 (observing that California’s compelled speech 
obligation regarding the availability of free or low-cost abortion services “in no way 
relates to the services that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to 
disclose information about state-sponsored services”). 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 121 
Zauderer was inapplicable to measure the validity of California’s law 
targeting licensed centers.337 
Breyer and the dissent, however, disagreed with the majority on 
its who-performs-the-services logic in distinguishing Zauderer.338 For 
Breyer, the key was not who directly performed the specific service in 
question (abortion).339 Instead, it was whether that service was “related 
to” a larger constellation of services and activities encompassing it 
(pregnancy counseling and other pregnancy services).340 As Breyer 
wrote, “information about state resources for family planning, prenatal 
care, and abortion is related to the services that licensed clinics 
provide. These clinics provide counseling about contraception (which 
is a family-planning service), ultrasounds or pregnancy testing (which 
is prenatal care), or abortion.”341 
In brief, the majority fought hard, by raising purported factual 
differences with Becerra, to hold inapplicable Zauderer’s rational-
basis exception to the general rule that content-based regulations of 
speech face heightened scrutiny.342 The dissent, in contrast, embraced 
Zauderer as a much more general rule—one not tightly tethered to the 
facts of that case—applicable to compelled-disclosure cases involving 
factual information.343 
The bottom line for the dissent in Becerra was that heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny was not warranted simply because speech 
was involved or because the regulations were content based.344 As 
Breyer put it in returning to his logic about the substantial overlap 
between speech and conduct from Expressions Hair Design,345 “much, 
perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech.”346 Becerra 
                                                   
 337. See id. at 2372-73 (discussing prior precedents allowing lower levels of 
scrutiny and noting why these precedents do not apply in this case). 
 338. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority misapplies 
relevant precedent on compelled notices). 
 339. See id. at 2387 (arguing that disclosures requirements should not trigger 
heightened scrutiny because such requirements do not prevent individuals from 
communicating their ideas). 
 340. Id. (emphasis omitted) (discussing the wider range of services that the 
clinic disclosure requirements relate to). 
 341. Id.  
 342. See id. at 2372-75 (majority opinion) (discussing why related First 
Amendment cases are inapplicable to this case). 
 343. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that “Zauderer is not so 
limited” as the majority would have it). 
 344. See id. (arguing that notice requirements alone should not trigger higher 
First Amendment protections). 
 345. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 346. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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was not, as the majority dubbed it, a “speech as speech” case.347 
Rather, it was a case involving “ordinary social and economic 
legislation”—more specifically, “ordinary disclosure laws” 
applicable, at least in the context of licensed centers, to medical 
professionals performing in their professional capacities.348 As such, 
the deferential standard of rational basis review embodied in 
Zauderer—a case in which, as Breyer explained in Becerra, the Court 
“refused to apply heightened scrutiny”349—was appropriate. 
Furthermore, because a core First Amendment value such as truth 
seeking in the marketplace of ideas was not jeopardized by the 
legislation—in fact, Breyer argued that California’s law enhanced and 
enriched the factual marketplace of ideas350—there was no reason to 
ratchet up the standard of review above rational basis.351 
Lurking beneath this battle over First Amendment scrutiny was 
the subtext that Becerra was as much a proxy fight over access to 
abortion procedures as it was a skirmish over the right not to be 
compelled by the government to speak. As Adam Liptak wrote for the 
New York Times, “[w]hile the decision’s legal analysis turned on the 
First Amendment, it was lost on no one that the justices most 
committed to defending abortion rights were all in dissent.”352 Put 
differently, the dispute over speech was a surrogate for a larger 
political and legal battle over abortion rights.353 
Only two years prior to Becerra, the Court’s liberal members 
(Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan and 
Sonia Sotomayor), along with Justice Kennedy, declared 
unconstitutional in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt two Texas 
regulations limiting access to abortions in the Lone Star State.354 In 
contrast, conservative Justice Clarence Thomas filed a solo dissent and 
                                                   
 347. Id. at 2374 (majority opinion). 
 348. Id. at 2380-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 349. Id. at 2386-87. 
 350. See id. at 2388 (contending that the marketplace of ideas “is fostered, not 
hindered, by providing information to patients to enable them to make fully informed 
medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies”). 
 351. See id. at 2387-88 (discussing the importance of the different ideas and 
viewpoints to First Amendment analysis and arguing that rational basis review should 
have been applied in this case). 
 352. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Backs Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers in 
Free Speech Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-crisis-pregnancy-center-abortion.html 
[https://perma.cc/29HS-2MBF]. 
 353. See id. (noting the political debate present in this case). 
 354. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299-300 (2016). 
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conservative Justice Samuel Alito, joined by conservative Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, also penned a 
dissent.355 The conservatives were caught shorthanded in Hellerstedt. 
That’s because Justice Antonin Scalia—a vehement opponent of the 
federal constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion356—had 
died in February 2016 and was not replaced until April 2017 by 
conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch.357 
The contrasting views on scrutiny in Becerra were thus arguably 
part of a larger battle over abortion rights. The conservatives prevailed 
this time in a ruling favoring pro-life organizations (the operators of 
crisis pregnancy centers).358 Kennedy voted with the liberals in 
Hellerstedt where no First Amendment issue was involved.359 He came 
back, however, to join the conservative bloc in Becerra in which he 
perceived California, via its own speech, was taking sides on 
abortion.360 As Kennedy explained in a concurrence joined by Roberts, 
Alito, and Gorsuch: 
[California] requires primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the 
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions. This compels 
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in 
basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these. And the 
history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive application suggest a real 
possibility that these individuals were targeted because of their beliefs.361 
The fact that abortion was the subject matter about which the 
regulated speech dealt clearly made a difference for the majority.362 To 
wit, Justice Thomas, in writing for the majority, focused on the fact 
that abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic’” when 
rebuffing the argument that Zauderer’s rational basis test should 
                                                   
 355. See id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 356. See Lyle Denniston, Rehnquist to Roberts: The “Reagan Revolution” 
Fulfilled?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 69 (2006) (identifying Justices Scalia and Thomas 
as “implacable foes of abortion”). 
 357. See Benjamin Pomerance, Inside a House Divided: Recent Alliances on 
the United States Supreme Court, 81 ALB. L. REV. 361, 361, 364 (2017) (noting 
Scalia’s death and Gorsuch’s confirmation). 
 358. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2378 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that the compelled notices violated 
freedom of speech). 
 359. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (holding Texas laws 
unconstitutional because they are undue burdens on abortion). 
 360. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (viewing 
the law as impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination). 
 361. Id. at 2379 
 362. See id. at 2375 (majority opinion) (discussing how the California’s 
license requirement infringes freedom of speech). 
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apply.363 He also invoked the marketplace of ideas metaphor.364 
Thomas even went so far as to quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
nearly century-old, seminal articulation of it in Abrams v. United 
States.365 Thomas did so to make it clear that California had no right 
to intervene and manipulate the speech market on a topic such as 
abortion where “[p]rofessionals might have a host of good-faith 
disagreements, both with each other and with the government.”366 In 
brief, as Thomas wrote, “California cannot co-opt the licensed 
facilities to deliver its message for it.”367 Yet, as if tipping his hand that 
the underlying subject matter of abortion made a key difference in 
ramping up scrutiny to stop California from delivering its message, 
Thomas added that “we do not question the legality of health and 
safety warnings long considered permissible.”368  
For the dissent, abortion also made a difference.369 That’s 
because, as Justice Breyer explained, it simply was not fair for the 
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
to allow the government to mandate that doctors discuss adoption 
options while, in Becerra, not allowing California to provide 
information about free and low-cost abortion services.370 As Breyer 
wrote: 
If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion 
about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a 
medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other 
                                                   
 363. Id. at 2372. 
 364. See id. at 2374-75. 
 365. See id. at 2375; see generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
(1919). Holmes wrote in dissent in Abrams that: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas–that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Professor Howard Wasserman encapsulates the 
importance of this language, writing that “Holmes arguably invented modern freedom 
of speech in his Abrams dissent, promoting constitutional primacy for speech in 
matters of public concern and protection for dissenting ideas so they can be tested and 
seek to prevail in the marketplace of ideas.” Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and 
Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 (2016). 
 366. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374-75. 
 367. Id. at 2376. 
 368. Id.  
 369. See id. at 2385. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 370. See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
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reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services? As the 
question suggests, there is no convincing reason to distinguish between 
information about adoption and information about abortion in this context. 
After all, the rule of law embodies evenhandedness . . . .371 
In summary, the Becerra majority applied its content-based-
versus-content-neutral framework to hold that heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny applied to measure the validity of the FACT 
Act’s compelled speech provision affecting licensed clinics.372 The 
majority rebutted arguments that any exception to that general rule—
namely, that content-based laws trigger heightened scrutiny—
applied.373 For the dissent, the compelled disclosure by a professional 
acting in his or her professional capacity of purely factual information 
that can help a person make a better-informed choice about an 
important matter merited only rational basis review.374 In the dissent’s 
estimation, no First Amendment value was sufficiently endangered by 
California’s law to justify a more intense level of scrutiny.375 
C. Janus 
The day after the Court ruled in Becerra, it handed down another 
five-to-four decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, & Municipal Employees, with the justices again clustering 
into conservative and liberal camps.376 Of central importance for this 
Article, the justices disagreed over whether the law at issue—an 
Illinois statute compelling public employees who are not members of 
the union that exclusively represents them in collective bargaining to 
pay agency fees to that union—merited heightened First Amendment 
review.377 
In concluding both that heightened scrutiny applied and that the 
law violated the First Amendment, Justice Alito reasoned for the 
                                                   
 371. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 372. See id. at 2371 (majority opinion). 
 373. See id. at 2371-72. 
 374. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 375. See id. 
 376. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018). 
 377. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/6(e) (2013). An agency fee “amounts to a 
percentage of the union dues.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. Under the Illinois statute at 
issue in the case, agency fees were chargeable to nonunion members for union 
activities including “the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract 
administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of 
employment.” 315/6(e). 
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conservative majority that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at 
stake” and that “the compelled subsidization of private speech 
seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.”378 That logic 
simultaneously gave life to the heart of petitioner Mark Janus’s central 
argument—that he should not be compelled to pay, via agency fees, 
for the union’s speech activities with which he disagreed, “including 
the positions it takes in collective bargaining”379—and dealt a death 
blow to the Court’s precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.380 In Abood, the Court held that a non-union member could 
be compelled to pay a fee for collective-bargaining activities but not 
for “ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.”381 
In explaining the need for heightened scrutiny in Janus, Alito 
went so far as to suggest that laws compelling speech—or, more 
precisely in this instance, compelling the subsidization of speech—are 
actually more dangerous than laws stopping one from speaking.382 
“When speech is compelled . . . additional damage is done. In that 
situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions,” 
Alito wrote.383 He added that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the 
speech of other private speakers raises similar First Amendment 
concerns.”384 
Alito also rebuffed the AFSCME’s argument that rational basis 
supplied the appropriate level of scrutiny.385 He derided that standard 
as a “form of minimal scrutiny . . . foreign to our free-speech 
jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”386 Put differently, some form of 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny was required in Janus. The 
question therefore became what heightened standard should apply. 
Much as the conservative majority did in Becerra where it found 
it unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny because the law there could not 
pass muster under the laxer intermediate scrutiny test,387 the majority 
in Janus said it did not need to use strict scrutiny because the agency-
                                                   
 378. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460, 2464. 
 379. Id. at 2461-62 (“The amended complaint claims that all ‘nonmember fee 
deductions are coerced political speech’ and that ‘the First Amendment forbids 
coercing any money from the nonmembers.’”). 
 380. See generally Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 381. Id. at 236. 
 382. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
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 384. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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 387. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2378 (2018) 
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fee requirement could not survive what Alito called a “more 
permissive standard.”388 That standard was what Alito called exacting 
scrutiny.389 Under it, the government must prove that: 1) it has a 
compelling interest in mandating the subsidization of private speech; 
and 2) alternative means of serving that interest do not exist that are 
“significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”390 
The first prong of this test mirrors strict scrutiny, as it requires 
the government to prove a compelling interest.391 The second prong, 
however, is slightly more relaxed than strict scrutiny, which requires 
the government to adopt “the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.”392 Exacting scrutiny therefore appears to 
fall somewhere between strict and intermediate scrutiny,393 with the 
latter typically requiring only a significant government interest rather 
than a compelling one.394  
Unfortunately, the Court sometimes uses the phrase exacting 
scrutiny synonymously with strict scrutiny, as the plurality did in 
United States v. Alvarez, thereby muddling the precise nature of 
exacting scrutiny.395 Indeed, as Professor David Han recently wrote, 
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 391. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) 
(emphasis added) (noting that a law is invalid under strict scrutiny unless “it is 
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest”). 
 392. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 393. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. 
REV. 207, 210 (2016) (describing an “understandable temptation to think of exacting 
scrutiny, as formulated above, as occupying a position between strict scrutiny and 
either intermediate or minimum scrutiny”). 
 394. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“In order 
to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.’” (quoting McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529))). 
 395. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 711 (2012). Writing for the 
plurality in Alvarez, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that the Stolen Valor Act 
was a content-based restriction of speech and thus was subject to review under 
“exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 715. In applying that level of scrutiny, however, the 
majority used language closely linked with strict scrutiny. See id. at 711. It wrote, for 
example, that “to recite the Government’s compelling interests is not to end the 
matter.” Id. at 725 (emphasis added). It also observed that “when the Government 
seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the ‘least restrictive means 
among available, effective alternatives.’” Id. at 729 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 
U.S. 656, 666 (2004)). The blurring of the line between strict and exacting scrutiny in 
Alvarez has been recognized by other scholars. See, e.g., Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud 
and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How United States 
v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. 
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the Court’s use of the term exacting scrutiny is “opaque and 
inconsistent.”396 Using exacting scrutiny as a fourth level of scrutiny—
one in addition to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational 
basis review—thus contributes to the scrutiny commotion at the heart 
of this Article. Regardless of the precise contours of exacting scrutiny, 
however, the Janus majority was clear that the Illinois statute could 
not surmount them.397 
The Janus dissent objected to the majority’s application of 
exacting scrutiny.398 In doing so and as described below, it focused less 
on the First Amendment speech rights of public employees like Mark 
Janus and more on the government’s interest in effectively and 
efficiently managing those employees in the name of workplace 
operations.399  
Justice Kagan, writing on behalf of herself and Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, asserted that the Court’s precedents 
provide government entities with “substantial latitude to regulate their 
employees’ speech—especially about terms of employment—in the 
interest of operating their workplaces effectively.”400 Therefore, rather 
than deploying a heightened level of scrutiny when the government 
plays the role of employer and regulates its employees’ speech to 
facilitate “workplace operations” and to “protect its managerial 
interests,” the Court owes the government “great deference.”401 As 
Kagan wrote: 
So long as the government is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting 
the employment relationship for other ends—it has a wide berth, 
comparable to that of a private employer. And when the regulated 
expression concerns the terms and conditions of employment—the very 
stuff of the employment relationship—the government really cannot lose.402 
                                                   
REV. 566, 588-89 (2014) (“In Alvarez, once the Court found that the Stolen Valor Act 
was a content-based restriction on speech, it was subjected to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ 
which functionally appears to be similar to strict scrutiny.”); see also John D. Moore, 
The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 
33 n.203 (2014) (observing that in Alvarez, Justice Kennedy’s use of “‘exacting 
scrutiny’ seems to bear the hallmarks of strict scrutiny”). 
 396. David S. Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 613, 635 (2018). 
 397. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2465 (2018) (holding that “the Illinois scheme cannot survive under even the more 
permissive standard” of exacting scrutiny).  
 398. See id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 399. See id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 2492-93, 2493 n.2. 
 402. Id. at 2493. 
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In brief, the law affecting speech in Janus was simply an 
example of “workaday economic and regulatory policy.”403 Janus was 
not a speech-as-speech case because—and in accord with Justice 
Breyer’s observations in both Expressions Hair Design404 and 
Becerra405 about the blurring of the line between speech and conduct—
“[s]peech is everywhere” and therefore “almost all economic and 
regulatory policy affects or touches speech,” Kagan opined.406 
The proper standard of review, at least for the dissent, was that 
developed in a line of public-employee workplace speech cases.407 
This standard is deferential to the government408 and sometimes is seen 
as akin to rational basis review.409 The three key cases are Pickering v. 
Board of Education,410 Connick v. Myers,411 and Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.412 As clarified in Garcetti, it is a two-part test that first asks 
if a public employee is speaking out in his or her role as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern.413 If the answer is no, then the government 
wins and censorship of the employee’s speech does not raise any First 
Amendment issues.414 If the answer is yes, then the public employee’s 
speech can still be censored, but the government must prove that its 
                                                   
 403. Id. at 2501. 
 404. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes 
place through speech.”); supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
 405. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch, perhaps 
most, human behavior takes place through speech.”). 
 406. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 407. See id. at 2491-93.  
 408. See Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware: New Limits on Public Employees’ 
Speech, 11 DEL. L. REV. 23, 23 (2009). As Professor Erin Daly succinctly explains it: 
In balancing the free speech rights of individuals against the ability of a 
government employer to control the workplace, the United States Supreme 
Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, has come down squarely on the side of 
the government. Garcetti v. Ceballos is the most recent salvo in a spate of 
cases spanning 40 years that has addressed this issue, and it is the most 
restrictive of the speech of public employees and the most deferential of 
employers. 
Id. 
 409. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment Right—Post-
Heller Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 48 (2009) (“In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
without explicitly saying so, the Court applied rational basis to reject a government 
employee’s free-speech claim where the speech was made in furtherance of the 
employee’s official duties.”). 
 410. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 411. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 412. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 413. See id. at 418. 
 414. See id.  
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censorship is “directed at speech that has some potential to affect [the 
government entity’s] operations.”415 As interpreted by Justice Kagan 
in Janus, this last requirement simply means that the government 
“needs to show that legitimate workplace interests lay behind the 
speech regulation.”416 
Applying this test to the facts of Janus, Kagan and the dissent 
had no problem finding that speech about collective bargaining and 
the terms and conditions of employment—the same topics about 
which Illinois compelled nonunion members such as Mark Janus to 
subsidize speech—are not matters of public concern.417 Instead, such 
expression is “about and directed to the workplace.”418 As Kagan 
summed it up, “[i]f an employee’s speech is about, in, and directed to 
the workplace, she has no ‘possibility of a First Amendment claim.’”419 
In brief, Mark Janus loses his case under this form of scrutiny. 
The dissent’s anger at the majority’s sharpening of the scrutiny 
scalpel to strike down decisions affecting workplace operations made 
by duly elected legislative bodies like the ones in Illinois was palpable 
in Janus. As Kagan bluntly put it, the majority had turned “the First 
Amendment into a sword,” “weaponizing” it to use in “such an 
aggressive way” that the justices are being transformed into “black-
robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices” as they “intervene in 
economic and regulatory policy.”420 In other words, an unelected 
judiciary is unnecessarily intruding into the province of the legislature, 
disturbing the balance of powers between those two branches of 
government and ignoring traditional principles of deference in the 
process.421 
Kagan also criticized the majority’s argument that heightened 
scrutiny was warranted because laws compelling speech are somehow 
more harmful than laws censoring speech.422 The majority’s 
contention “lack[ed] force,”423 Kagan explained, because it relied on 
an anomalous case with a radically different set of facts—namely, 
                                                   
 415. Id. at 411, 418. 
 416. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
 417. See id. at 2495-96.  
 418. Id. at 2495. 
 419. Id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).  
 420. Id. at 2501-02. 
 421. See id. 
 422. See id. at 2464 (majority opinion); id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 423. Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,424 and a law 
requiring public school children to salute the American flag and recite 
the pledge of allegiance.425 Janus, instead, was about the compelled 
subsidization of the speech of others in an employment context and 
thus actually merited a lower level of scrutiny.426 
In addition to Justice Kagan’s dissent on behalf of all of the 
liberal justices, Justice Sotomayor issued a brief solo dissent in 
Janus.427 In it, she objected to how the Court’s decision in Sorrell was 
being used aggressively in cases such as Becerra.428 As described 
earlier, Sotomayor had joined—as the lone liberal—with the 
conservatives in the majority in Sorrell.429 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Leslie Kendrick recently asserted that “the fact that a 
law implicates ‘speech’ does not mean that it implicates ‘the freedom 
of speech.’”430 Her observation crisply captures the fissure between the 
conservative majorities and liberal dissents in 2018 in Becerra and 
Janus.431 
For the conservatives, both cases directly implicated the First 
Amendment freedom of speech and thus required a level of scrutiny 
greater than rational basis review. For the liberals, both cases also 
involved speech, but only within the context of workaday economic 
and social regulations, thereby not warranting heightened review. 
Although all of the justices seemingly agree today that heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny applies when a statute affecting 
                                                   
 424. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
 425. See id. at 626. 
 426. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And if anything, the 
First Amendment scales tip the opposite way when (as here) the government is not 
compelling actual speech, but instead compelling a subsidy that others will use for 
expression.”). 
 427. See id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 428. See id. 
 429. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658-59 (identifying the 
justices in the majority in Sorrell). 
 430. Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of 
Speech” 116 MICH. L. REV. 667, 676 (2018). 
 431. See id. 
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nongovernmental speech432 is viewpoint based,433 everything else is 
much more fluid. Justice Breyer’s bendable proportionality approach 
greases the skids for intensified ambiguity,434 while Sorrell provides a 
wrecking ball for conservatives to destroy the walls separating 
customary levels of scrutiny.435 
Viewed at a macro level, the conservatives generally focus on 
whether a statute is content based, content neutral, or targets specific 
speakers to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.436 The liberals, 
                                                   
 432. The government speech doctrine, which applies when the government—
not a private person or private entity—is the speaker, provides an exception to the rule 
that viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny review. That 
is because the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment only “restricts government 
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.” Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); see also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is 
not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”). 
The Court explained in 2017 that: 
[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on government speech 
would be paralyzing. When a government entity embarks on a course of 
action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others. The 
Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint 
neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture. 
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017). 
 433. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2381 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rebuking the majority opinion in Becerra for 
saying “nothing about limiting its language to the kind of instance where the Court 
has traditionally found the First Amendment wary of content-based laws, namely, in 
cases of viewpoint discrimination”); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (asserting, in a concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, that viewpoint discrimination constitutes “a form 
of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., 
concurring) (opining that strict scrutiny always applies when a “regulation facially 
differentiates on the basis of viewpoint”); Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2256-63 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (asserting, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, that a Texas statute affecting specialty license 
plates allowed the state to engage in “blatant viewpoint discrimination,” noting that 
Texas’s rationale for the statute “cannot withstand strict scrutiny,” and adding that 
“Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint”). 
 434. See supra Part II (discussing Breyer’s proportionality approach). 
 435. For instance, Justice Kagan wrote in 2018 in Janus that the Court in 
Sorrell “wielded the First Amendment in . . . an aggressive way.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n 
State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately in Janus to express her agreement with Kagan’s 
sentiment about Sorrell, adding that “I disagree with the way that this Court has since 
interpreted and applied that opinion.” Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 436. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) 
(noting that “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
 Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case? 133 
on the other hand, increasingly concentrate on whether the regulated 
speech serves an important value or purpose for which the First 
Amendment exists in order to decide the correct standard of judicial 
review.437 
Along the way, questions of whether a law’s impact on speech 
is something more than “incidental” come into play for the Court’s 
conservative justices.438 The liberal justices, especially Breyer, place 
less emphasis on the speech-versus-conduct dichotomy.439 They 
assume speech is inextricably bound up in most types of conduct,440 
and therefore judicial effort is better expended ferreting out whether 
the speech serves a vital First Amendment value.441 If for the 
conservatives “incidental” is an elastic term to exploit as needed, then 
for the liberals the concept of the “true value” of protecting speech, 
along with reserving elevated First Amendment review only for 
“better things,” play equally flexible roles.442 
Free speech jurisprudence regarding the applicable level of 
scrutiny in any given case sits at a crossroads after Becerra and Janus. 
The justices, of course, have options about which direction to take. For 
instance, should they continue to use the content-based law versus 
content-neutral law formula for determining the appropriate level of 
scrutiny?443 It is an imperfect approach that, as the Court observed 
                                                   
simply a means to control content,” and adding that “[q]uite apart from the purpose 
or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a 
constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers”). 
 437. See supra notes 216-224 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the 
consideration of whether a burden imposed on speech is incidental). 
 439. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that “it is often wiser not to try to distinguish 
between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct’”). 
 440. See id. (asserting that “virtually all government regulation affects speech. 
Human relations take place through speech. And human relations include community 
activities of all kinds—commercial and otherwise”); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Speech is everywhere—a part of every human activity 
(employment, health care, securities trading, you name it).”); Nat’l Inst. of Family & 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(contending that “much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech”). 
 441. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 442. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 
2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 443. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (addressing the content-
based versus content neutral law approach). 
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twenty-five years ago, is not always simple.444 What’s more, the Court 
has long carved out exceptions, via tools such as the commercial 
speech doctrine445 and the secondary effects doctrine, from the general 
rule that content-based laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny.446 
Furthermore, legal scholars over the years have identified a “broad 
range of problems associated with the distinction between content-
based and content-neutral speech regulations.”447 
A second option is to let the value served by the speech in 
question—facilitating democratic self-governance,448 discovering the 
truth about matters of public concern,449 or perhaps advancing some 
other value450—determine the level of scrutiny. This approach is 
                                                   
 444. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding 
whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a 
simple task.”). 
 445. See supra note 117 (noting that laws targeting commercial speech are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny review). 
 446. See Fee, supra note 60, at 292 (noting that the secondary effects doctrine 
“provides that a regulation will be treated as content-neutral and subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-discriminatory form, if the primary purpose 
of the regulation is to control the secondary effects rather than the primary effects of 
speech”); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis 
After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385, 386 (2017) (noting that 
“facially content-sensitive government actions” targeting sexually oriented businesses 
are treated under a secondary effects analysis with a more deferential level of review 
under intermediate scrutiny). 
 447. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of 
Speech: A Distinction That is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2085 
(2015). 
 448. See Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Community: Reply to Bender, 29 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 495 (1997) (asserting “that the value of democratic self-
governance is the most powerful explanation of the general pattern of First 
Amendment decisions . . . [and] democratic self-governance is the only value that can 
convincingly account for the specific set of decisions protecting the abusive, 
outrageous and indecent speech”); see also Eugene Volokh, Response: In Defense of 
the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 
VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (writing that “a broad vision of democratic self-
government is one important justification for free speech”).  
 449. See Post, supra note 75, at 2363 (“The theory of the marketplace of ideas 
focuses on ‘the truth-seeking function’ of the First Amendment.”). 
 450. Scholars have offered many reasons over the years why it is important to 
protect expression under the First Amendment. Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 274 (1999) 
(“The freedoms of speech and press . . . are said to promote and to protect discovery 
of truth, democratic self-governance, self-realization, dissent, tolerance, and honest 
government.”). 
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intimated by the dissents in both Becerra451 and Janus.452 It also 
reverberates in former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post’s 
observation that “First Amendment analysis is relevant only when the 
values served by the First Amendment are implicated.”453  
Under this methodology, heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny—be it strict or intermediate—would only apply when some 
higher-level value (on a First Amendment hierarchy of values) is 
served by the speech being regulated. Thus, the justices would need to 
agree on and establish a clear hierarchy of First Amendment values 
for this approach to function in a consistent and coherent manner. 
Without an agreed-upon hierarchy of values, the subjectivity of this 
approach would undermine confidence in its application. 
A pure values-based approach would also call into question—or 
at least call for revisiting—a host of cases where some level of 
heightened scrutiny was applied but where the value of the speech 
seemingly had nothing to do with lofty ideals such as truth discovery 
or voting wisely in a self-governing democracy.454 As noted in the 
Introduction, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to protect 
minors’ access to violent video games455 and it applies intermediate 
scrutiny to judge the constitutionality of laws regulating sexually 
oriented businesses.456 Under a value-based methodology for 
discerning the correct level of scrutiny in these scenarios, it seems that 
rational basis review might be more appropriate.  
A third route is to jettison a distinct levels-of-scrutiny approach 
and instead apply Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach in all 
cases affecting speech.457 Under this tack, which is embraced in many 
                                                   
 451. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
 452. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 453. Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249, 1255 (1995). 
 454. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004) (1948) (suggesting that the 
ultimate aim of free speech “is the voting of wise decisions,” and contending that 
voters “must be made as wise as possible”). 
 455. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (addressing the Supreme 
Court’s deployment of strict scrutiny in Brown v. Entn’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 
(2011)). 
 456. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (addressing the use of 
intermediate scrutiny in cases involving the zoning of sexually oriented businesses). 
 457. See supra Part II (discussing Breyer’s proportionality approach). 
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countries,458 the Court would use a balancing methodology.459 It would 
weigh anew in each case whether the burdens imposed on speech are 
disproportionate to the beneficial consequences of regulating it.460 
Gone would be the separate tests of strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and rational basis review in cases affecting speech. Such 
tests, if they had use at all, would become, in Breyer’s judicial world, 
merely “guidelines.”461 Yet proportionality itself is subject to 
criticism.462 Additionally, whether four other justices would go along 
with a proportionality framework remains to be seen, although Justice 
Kagan’s concurrence in Reed v. Town of Gilbert—a concurrence 
joined by Justice Breyer—intimates that she too might embrace it.463 
Kagan also joined Breyer’s concurrence attacking a rigid levels-of-
scrutiny approach in United States v. Alvarez.464 
A fourth possibility is for the Court to develop well-defined tests 
for determining what constitutes both an “incidental” burden on 
speech465 and an instance of ordinary or workaday economic and social 
                                                   
 458. Grant Huscroft, Proportionality and Pretense, 29 CONST. COMMENTARY 
229, 229 (2014) (reviewing Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and 
Their Limitations (2012)) (“Proportionality is an analytical framework used by courts 
in many countries in determining whether or not limitations on the exercise of rights 
are justified, and therefore constitutional.”). 
 459. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? 
American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799 
(2011) (observing that proportionality is “an analytical procedure with balancing at 
its core”).  
 460. See id. at 802. 
 461. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 462. For example, Professor Bernhard Schlink notes that a major problem with 
proportionality is that “balancing of rights, interests, and values entailed in the 
analysis of appropriateness is unavoidably subjective. There is no objective standard 
for measuring and weighing free speech vs. privacy, freedom vs. safety, privacy vs. 
public health, or the protection of an endangered species vs. the creation of badly 
needed jobs.” Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why 
Everywhere but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 299 (2012). 
 463. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236, 2238-39 (Kagan, J., 
concurring) (2015) (observing that “[o]ur cases have been far less rigid than the 
majority admits in applying strict scrutiny to facially content-based laws,” contending 
that “we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely reasonable’ laws imperiled 
by strict scrutiny can survive,” and concluding that “there is no need to decide in this 
case whether strict scrutiny applies to every sign ordinance in every town across this 
country containing a subject-matter exemption”). 
 464. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730-31 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  
 465. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the 
incidental burden issue). 
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regulation.466 As addressed above, the incidental burden standard is 
pivotal for some justices in deciding whether something greater than 
rational basis review applies to a regulation of speech.467 Similarly, the 
dissents in both Becerra and Janus make it evident that rational basis 
review applies to ordinary economic and social regulations that 
involve speech.468 If the concepts of an incidental burden and ordinary 
economic and social regulation provide the pivotal yardsticks for 
determining when rational basis review is relevant, then those 
concepts must be better defined. Furthermore, accompanying tests for 
determining when a burden is incidental and when a law is ordinary 
economic and social regulation must be articulated.  
As for now, however, it is clear from Sorrell, Becerra, and Janus 
that the justices simply cannot always agree when a heightened 
standard of scrutiny applies in a case involving expression.469 If, to use 
                                                   
 466. See supra notes 29, 40, 42, 62-63, 128-135, 318, 403 and accompanying 
text (discussing the concepts of ordinary and/or workaday economic and social 
legislation). 
 467. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the 
incidental burden issue). Writing more than thirty years ago, Professor Geoffrey Stone 
explained the Court’s general methodology regarding incidental burdens. As he put 
it: 
[T]he Court’s approach to incidental restrictions reflects an effort to avoid 
endless inquiries into incidental effect while at the same time invalidating 
those restrictions that most seriously threaten free expression. The general 
presumption is that incidental restrictions do not raise a question of First 
Amendment review. The presumption is waived, however, whenever an 
incidental restriction either has a highly disproportionate impact on free 
expression or directly penalizes expressive activity. And the latter exception 
is applied quite liberally whenever the challenged restriction significantly 
limits the opportunities for free expression. It is an uneasy but not 
unprincipled compromise. 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 114 (1987). 
 468. See supra notes 29, 40, 42, 62, 128-135 and accompanying text 
(discussing the concept of ordinary economic and social legislation). 
 469. This Article focuses on cases in which the justices could not agree on 
whether some level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny—be it a variation of 
either strict or intermediate scrutiny—applies or whether only rational basis review is 
appropriate. There are, of course, other relatively recent First Amendment speech 
cases in which the justices also could not agree on the correct standard of scrutiny. 
See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that a content-
based sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it could not survive strict scrutiny 
but including concurring opinions penned by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan that 
openly questioned the merits of applying strict scrutiny and suggesting it was 
unnecessary to apply that rigorous level of review); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014) (involving the constitutionality of a statute restricting speech outside of 
facilities that perform abortions and featuring the Court fracturing over scrutiny, with 
five justices finding the statute was content neutral and therefore applying 
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Justice Kagan’s provocative phrasing, the conservatives are 
“weaponizing the First Amendment”470 by needlessly—and 
harmfully—ratcheting up the level of scrutiny in these cases and using 
the amendment as what Professor Stanley Fish once called “a political 
instrument,”471 then perhaps the liberals may be seen (equally as 
provocative) as trying to neuter the First Amendment by only 
elevating scrutiny in cases where core free-speech values are 
jeopardized. Regardless of which side is right, today’s conflict over 
scrutiny and what constitutes a true speech-as-speech case meriting 
heightened review leaves First Amendment jurisprudence in even 
greater disarray than it was before.472 The justices now dial up or dial 
down the level of scrutiny almost at will, deciding on and picking a 
specific level that allows them to uphold or strike down a law as they 
so desire. 
                                                   
intermediate scrutiny, three justices finding it was content based and thus applying 
strict scrutiny, and one justice finding the law was viewpoint based and therefore 
automatically unconstitutional). 
 470. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 471. Stanley Fish, Colloquy: Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 883, 891 (1997) (“This brings me to a final point, one I have made in other 
venues: the First Amendment is a political instrument; not an apolitical principle to 
which you can be faithful or unfaithful.”). 
 472. See Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of 
Free Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 131, 133 (2010) (contending that 
“many free speech doctrines appear incoherent”); Post, supra note 453, at 1249-50 
(asserting that “contemporary First Amendment doctrine is . . . striking chiefly for its 
superficiality, its internal incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive 
judicial engagement with significant contemporary social issues connected with 
freedom of speech”).  
